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Abstract
This paper studies the spread of losses and defaults in financial networks with two inter-
related features: collateral requirements and alternative contract termination rules. When
collateral is committed to a firm’s counterparties, a solvent firm may default if it lacks suffi-
cient liquid assets to meet its payment obligations. Collateral requirements can thus increase
defaults and payment shortfalls. Moreover, one firm may benefit from the failure of another
if the failure frees collateral committed by the surviving firm, giving it additional resources
to make other payments. Contract termination at default may also improve the ability of
other firms to meet their obligations through access to collateral. As a consequence of these
features, the timing of payments and collateral liquidation must be carefully specified to
establish the existence of payments that clear the network. Using this framework, we show
that dedicated collateral may lead to more defaults than pooled collateral; we study the
consequences of illiquid collateral for the spread of losses through fire sales; we compare
networks with and without selective contract termination; and we analyze the impact of al-
ternative resolution and bankruptcy stay rules that limit the seizure of collateral at default.
Under an upper bound on derivatives leverage, full termination reduces payment shortfalls
compared with selective termination.
JEL Classifications: D53, D70, E44, G1, G28, G33, K22
Keywords: Contagion, OTC markets, financial regulation, network, fire sales, collateral,
automatic stays for qualified financial contracts
1 Introduction
This paper studies the spread of losses and defaults through financial networks when payment
obligations are at least partly secured by collateral. A combination of changes in regulation
and industry practices following the financial crisis of 2007–2009 have greatly expanded the use
of collateral in trading and lending. In the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market, most
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standardized contracts now trade through central counterparties, which require participants to
post collateral in the form of initial margin (IM). The part of the market that continues to trade
bilaterally is now also subject to IM requirements. Similarly, unsecured interbank lending is far
lower than its pre-crisis levels and has mostly been replaced by collateralized lending through
repurchase agreements. See, e.g., Duffie [13], Ghamami and Glasserman [24], Financial Stability
Board [21], and pages 107–126 of the U.S. Department of Treasury Report [43] for background.
Collateral provides a buffer against the spread of losses: if one party to a contract defaults
on a payment obligation, its counterparty can seize available collateral to offset the loss. In this
sense, collateral supports financial stability.
But, as our analysis will show, this is not the whole story. We highlight additional mecha-
nisms that complicate the impact of collateral. First, committing collateral to specific contracts
and counterparties can lead to an ex post inefficient allocation of a firm’s assets: a firm may
find itself unable to make a current payment obligation on one contract despite having posted
collateral to protect future potential obligations on other contracts. Firms do not ordinarily
have the option to terminate contracts to recover posted collateral. In reducing counterparty
credit risk, collateral requirements can increase strains on funding liquidity, because collateral
requirements create additional funding needs.1 These effects are intimately connected to con-
tract termination rights, because terminating a contract can provide access to collateral and,
indeed, is ordinarily necessary for access to collateral.
Collateral held in less liquid assets creates a further consequence for contagion. At the
failure of one institution, its counterparties would seize and liquidate collateral. This sell-off or
fire sale could drive down the price of the collateral assets, creating market losses at other firms
holding those assets. In particular, firms that had posted similar assets as collateral would find
themselves with a collateral shortfall — and an obligation to add collateral — as a result of the
fire sale. See Stein [40], Shleifer and Vishny [36], Chapters 1 and 2 of Gennaioli and Shleifer
[23], and the references therein for background on the role of fire sales in financial crises.
We develop these ideas in a network model. The nodes of the network are parties to financial
contracts; for brevity, we sometimes refer to these as banks, though we have in mind a broader
set of financial and even non-financial companies. The nodes are linked through contracts that
carry payment obligations. We take the network configuration as an input to our analysis; our
model does not seek to explain how a particular configuration comes about.
We build on the standard framework of Eisenberg and Noe [17]. The Eisenberg-Noe model
1Researchers have also debated the implications for economic growth of the demand for safe assets as collateral;
see Duffie et al. [14] and Sidanius and Zikes [37] for estimates of the demand. Our analysis addresses the
distribution and allocation of collateral, rather than its overall level.
2
takes a set of nodes with balance sheets linked through uncollateralized payment obligations
and identifies one or more clearing vectors. A clearing vector describes a set of actual payments
under which a node never pays more than it owes, all contracts have equal seniority, and nodes
face limited liability. These properties lead to a fixed-point characterization of clearing pay-
ments. The Eisenberg-Noe model has been extended to cover many other features, including
bankruptcy costs (Rogers and Veraart [35]) and claims of different seniority (Elsinger [18]) or
maturity (Kusnetsov and Veraart [32]); see Cabrales, Gale, and Gottardi [8], Glasserman and
Young [25], Hurd [28], and Jackson and Pernoud [30] for overviews and extensive references. De-
spite these many extensions, the inclusion of collateral poses special complications and requires
a departure from the usual solution approach.
In a collateralized network, the failure of one node may improve the ability of other nodes
to meet their obligations. If a surviving node had committed collateral to a contract with the
failed node, the failure frees that collateral, providing the surviving node additional resources
to make other payments. Indeed, the freed collateral might even be necessary for the surviving
node to meet its obligations, in which case the failure of one node prevents the failure of
another. We will show that under these circumstances the notion of clearing payments may not
be well-defined.
In an equilibrium of the Eisenberg-Noe model, the timing of events (payments and defaults)
is immaterial, and these events may be understood as occurring simultaneously. In modeling
collateral, we separate the timing of two types of events following a default. We assume that
creditors have immediate access to collateral posted by the defaulting node; but the freeing of
collateral posted to the default node will follow a short delay. This modeling choice is supported
by Key Principle 5 of the BCBS-IOSCO [4] (p.20) principles on margin requirements for non-
cleared derivatives: Initial margin collected should be held in such a way as to ensure that (i) the
margin collected is immediately available to the collecting party in the event of the counterparty’s
default, and (ii) the collected margin must be subject to arrangements that protect the posting
party to the extent possible under applicable law in the event that the collecting party enters
bankruptcy. The return of collateral in (ii) does not carry the same urgency as the access to
collateral in (i), so we will not assume they occur simultaneously.
By separating these events we show that we can arrive at a well-defined set of clearing
payments. The separation eliminates the possibility that the failure of one node could prevent
the failure of another node by freeing collateral — a scenario we see as unrealistic as well as
a complication for the analysis. Along with the clearing payments, we characterize the set of
defaulting nodes and the redistribution of collateral.
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We use this framework to evaluate the effects on a network of various policy options related
to collateral and contract termination rights, because contract termination controls access to
collateral. We take as our measures of financial stability the size of the default set and the
network’s total payment shortfall. We examine these measures in various scenarios and establish
the following conclusions.
(i) Costless termination. As a starting point for comparion, we consider networks in which
nodes are free to terminate contracts, and we show that under this assumption posting collateral
is equivalent to making certain payments, so collateral plays no essential role. This reference
point establishes the close connection between access to collateral and restrictions on contract
termination that runs through the rest of our analysis.
(ii) Pooled collateral. We investigate the tradeoff between committing collateral to specific
counterparties versus pooling collateral and holding additional cash. This tradeoff is analogous
to the comparison between collateral requirements and capital requirements — capital absorbs
any type of loss, whereas collateral protects specific obligations. Although pooling may appear
to allow a better allocation of resources, we show that pooling is guaranteed to reduce defaults
under additional conditions. For instance, we show that when committed collateral exceeds
current payment obligations, pooling reduces defaults and does not affect payment shortfalls.
This result is applicable with derivative contracts. Since in OTC derivatives markets, collateral
in the form of initial margin captures in part extreme potential future exposures, it can exceed
current payments (Ghamami [27]). In general, however, pooling may produce larger or smaller
payment shortfalls, depending on a node’s position in the network, so the tradeoff cannot be
resolved by considering a node in isolation.
(iii) Collateral illiquidity. We expand our model to capture the potential spread of losses
through collateral fire sales. We extend the method of Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin [10],
which models illiquidity through a price-impact function. When a node fails, its creditors
liquidate collateral, driving down its price and lowering the value of similar assets held by
other nodes. This price-mediated channel amplifies losses beyond the direct effect of missed
payments. Collateral illiquidity increases defaults and payment shortfalls.
(iv) Automatic stays. We consider the effect of a stay under which payments are made
before collateral is liquidated and show that it has no effect on defaults or payment shortfalls
when collateral is liquid. We interpret this point as consistent with the policy recommendations
of Duffie and Skeel [15] and the subsequent finalized stay rule on collateral sale in repo markets,
under which collateral can be accessed immediately only if it is held in cash or cash-like assets.
(v) Accelerated payments triggered by defaults. Shortly after Lehman Brothers filed for
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bankruptcy, its counterparties terminated approximately 733,000 of over 900,000 OTC deriva-
tives contracts (Fleming and Sarkar [22]). A contract termination creates a new payment
obligation, equal to the market value of the contract, from the out-of-the-money party to the
in-the-money party. Lehman’s counterparties generally terminated contracts with positive value
to the surviving party and chose not to terminate contracts with positive value to Lehman. We
expand our model to compare this type of selective termination (known as “cherry-picking”)
with full termination.
Incorporating accelerated payments through contract termination complicates the analysis,
again because one node can benefit from the failure of another, in this case because a default
by one node may accelerate payments to other nodes. Arriving at a well-defined set of clearing
payments requires making further assumptions on the timing of events; we assume a delay
between the failure of a node and any accelerated payments resulting from that failure. This
modeling choice is supported by the unfolding of the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008. Claims
against Lehman resulting from contract termination became part of the bankruptcy process,
leading to delays in payments, as discussed in Fleming and Sarkar [22].
(vi) Alternative contract termination rights. Using the framework of accelerated payments,
we compare networks under different contract termination protocols and discuss these compar-
isons in the context of post-crisis automatic stay rules2 on access to collateral upon a counter-
party’s failure. We compare three scenarios: selective termination (cherry-picking) by surviving
nodes, full termination of all contracts with a failed node, and no termination. We show that
selective termination ordinarily results in fewer defaults; but we also show that full termination
can reduce systemwide payment shortfalls under a constraint on a measure of firms’ deriva-
tives leverage. We make a similar comparison of full-termination and no-termination scenarios.
These comparisons are motivated by continuing discussions on the treatment of derivatives in
the bankruptcy and resolution of large financial institutions. See Jackson [31], Ghamami [26],
the U.S. Department of the Treasury Report [44], and the references therein.
Section 2 reviews the Eisenberg-Noe model, explains the difficulties introduced by collateral,
and presents our solution; it also examines the case of costless contract termination and collat-
eral pooling. Section 3 introduces illiquid collateral and presents the joint solution of clearing
payments and market prices for collateral assets, along with the implications for defaults and
payment shortfalls. Section 4 extends our model to cover accelerated payments from contract
2These rules generally apply to what are known as qualified financial contracts (QFCs), which include deriva-
tives and repos. See Duffie and Skeel [15], Skeel [38], and Roe and Adams [34] for legal background on stays for
QFCs. See Bolton and Oehmke [6] and Duffie and Wang [16] for corporate finance and game theoretic models
of automatic stays and contract termination.
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termination. Section 5 compares defaults and payment shortfalls under alternative termination
scenarios governing collateral access. We defer all proofs to an appendix.
2 Network Model
In this section, we first review the model of Eisenberg and Noe [17] and then introduce collateral.
2.1 Networks without Collateral
We consider a network with nodes N = {1, . . . , N} representing banks or other market partici-
pants. (We can also think of one node as representing the outside world.) We use the following
notation:
p̄ij = payment due from i to j, i, j ∈ N ;
ci = cash held by node i ∈ N ;
pij = actual payment from i to j, i, j ∈ N .
We refer to ci as cash for brevity; more generally, ci represents the near-term cash value of
assets (other than the p̄ji) available to node i to make payments. We assume that payment
obligations are netted so that p̄ij and p̄ji cannot both be strictly positive.
We seek to model default triggered by illiquidity rather than insolvency, and this differen-
tiates our formulation from most interbank network models. In our setting, the claims and
obligations p̄ij and cash values ci are not intended to provide a complete accounting of a node’s
balance sheet; each node would typically have other longer-term assets and liabilities. The p̄ij
measure payments due. A node defaults if it does not have the cash to make a payment, even if
the total value of its assets exceeds the value of its liabilities. Each ci includes the cash a node
could raise by borrowing against longer-term assets.
We imagine that, outside the model, some nodes have experienced an exogenous loss of
asset value, and we proceed to evaluate payments made, taking the ci as cash levels after the
exogenous shock. Given a collection of payments pij , node i’s cash is given by
Aoi = ci +
∑
k 6=i
pki, (1)
and its payments due are given by
Li =
∑
k 6=i
p̄ik. (2)
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Node i defaults if Aoi < Li, so the default set is
D = {i : N : Aoi < Li}.
If node i defaults, its creditors’ claims all have equal priority, and any remaining cash held
by node i is paid to the creditors in proportion to their claims. These proportions are given by
aoij = p̄ij/
∑
k 6=i
p̄ik, i, j ∈ N . (3)
For each i, we have
∑
j 6=i a
o
ij = 1.
Clearing payments are characterized by the fixed-point equation
pij = p̄ij ∧ aoijAoi
= p̄ij ∧
ci + aoij∑
k 6=i
pki
 . (4)
This specification ensures that actual payments never exceed obligations (pij ≤ p̄ij); all creditors
have equal priority, in the sense that they receive payments proportional to their claims in the
event of default; and the total payments made
∑
j 6=i pij cannot exceed the available cash A
o
i (p).
Eisenberg and Noe [17] showed the existence of a solution to (4) and also gave conditions for
uniqueness. Tarski’s [41] fixed-point theorem ensures the existence of a largest and a smallest
solution of (4).
2.2 Networks with Collateral: Round 1
We now introduce collateral, which we also refer to as initial margin (IM). We let
mij = margin posted by node i for obligations to node j.
Suppose, for example, that nodes i and j are two banks that have entered into a swap contract.
Under rules adopted in the U.S. in 2015 and 2016, each bank is required to post IM as collateral
against potential future payments to the other bank.3 If node j is a central counterparty (CCP),
then i posts IM to j, but j does post IM to i. Because IM is intended to cover potential future
losses, a node will often face a margin requirement on a contract even if no payment is due.
We will refer to mij as margin posted or committed by node i to node j. We assume that
the margin mij remains an asset of node i until node i fails to make a payment to node j.
4
3U.S. banking regulators and the CFTC finalized their uncleared swap margin rules in 2015 and 2016. U.S.
margin rules for uncleared swap transactions follow closely the guidelines established by the BCBS-IOSCO [4].
4This assumption is consistent with the treatment of IM in practice. The required IM is commonly held by
a third-party custodian.
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The quantity mij differs from other assets held by node i in that node j’s claim to the mij has
priority over the claims of any other creditors. We take mii = 0 for all i.
We assume the following sequence of events at default. Node i goes into default when it
has insufficient cash (including payments received from other nodes) to meet its obligations.
Rather than make partial payments that would not stave off default, node i briefly suspends
making any payments. At this point, node j seizes enough of the collateral mij to cover any
payment due p̄ij from i to j. The amount of collateral seized by node j from node i is given by
∆ij =
{
mij ∧ p̄ij , i ∈ D;
0, i 6∈ D. (5)
In particular, if node i defaults, node j’s claim to the collateral mij is determined solely by the
payment obligation p̄ij and is unaffected by any other claims on node i’s assets. This is the
defining feature of collateral.
If the margin seized by node j from node i is insufficient to cover the obligation p̄ij , node j
retains a residual claim of p̄ij −mij , which has equal priority with any residual claims against
i by other nodes. This claim will produce a partial payment from i to j if node i has any
remaining assets. To reflect a pro rata allocation of node i’s cash to these equal-priority claims,
we replace (3) with the proportions5
a
(1)
ij = [p̄ij −mij ]
+/
∑
k 6=i
[p̄ik −mik]+, i, j ∈ N . (6)
If the denominator is zero, no node has a residual claim on i, and we may set a
(1)
ij ≡ 0; if node
i does not default, set a
(1)
ij = a
o
ij , as in (3).
Let p
(1)
ij denote the total payment made by node i to node j, consisting of any collateral
seizure ∆ij and any partial payments based on the proportions (6). Given payments p
(1)
ki made
to node i, the cash available to node i is given by
A
(1)
i = ci +
∑
k
p
(1)
ki ; (7)
this expression has the same form as (1), but it includes node i’s access to collateral mki posted
by other nodes and seized according to (5). The set of defaulting nodes is given by
D = {i ∈ N : A(1)i < Li}, (8)
5The assumption that collateral is taken first and the bankrupt firm’s assets are distributed in proportion to
the residual claims is consistent with the legal discussion in Ayer, Bernstein, and Friedland [2].
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with the sets Li as in (2). The requirements for first-round clearing payments p
(1)
ij now take the
form
p
(1)
ij =
{
p̄ij ∧ [mij + a(1)ij A
(1)
i ], i ∈ D;
p̄ij , i 6∈ D.
(9)
These conditions extend (4) using (6)–(8) and including the collateral mij . If, for some j,
mij + a
(1)
ij A
(1)
i < p̄ij , then a
(1)
ij A
(1)
i < p̄ij , and node i is in default. We may therefore write (9)
as
p
(1)
ij = p̄ij ∧ [mij + a
(1)
ij A
(1)
i ]. (10)
This expression is similar to the Eisenberg-Noe equation (4), but the similarity hides an im-
portant difference: we cannot recover the default set from payments in (10) because a node in
default may meet its payment obligations through access to collateral. In (4), pij = p̄ij implies
that node i had not defaulted, but we cannot make a similar inference from p
(1)
ij = p̄ij in (10).
We will confirm the existence of clearing payments p(1) = {p(1)ij , i, j ∈ N} satisfying (6)–(10)
shortly, but we first elaborate on the potential complications introduced by collateral.
2.3 Freed Collateral: Round 2
Following a default by node i, it may happen that the collateral committed to node j exceeds
the payment obligation to j, in which case the excess mij−∆ij would become available to node
i to meet other obligations. If another node k also defaults, then margin mik posted by i to
k may also become available to i. This return of collateral is potentially problematic for the
existence of clearing payments, as the following example illustrates.
Example 2.1. Consider the network illustrated in Figure 1, with nodes A, B, and C. The
number inside each circle indicates the node’s cash; all cash levels are initially zero. The arrows
indicate the directions of payment obligations, and the labels on the arrows indicate the amounts
due. The labels in square brackets show posted margin. For example, the label “[5-A]” above
node C indicates that node A has posted collateral worth 5 to node C.
As no node has cash, all nodes default. The default of node C returns collateral worth 5 to
A, and similarly B and C each recover collateral worth 5 from the defaults A and B. The result
is the configuration in the middle of the figure. With the freed collateral, all nodes can meet
their payment obligations, resulting in the final configuration.
But if all nodes have met their payment obligations, have they defaulted? It is not possible in
this example to simultaneously determine a consistent set of payments and default designations.
In the rightmost configuration, no node appears to be in default, but we cannot reach that
configuration without freeing collateral, which requires defaults.
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Figure 1: A three-node network. All nodes start with zero cash. The labels in brackets show
collateral — the amount posted and the posting party.
The problem illustrated by this example is that the default of one node can lead to the
return of collateral to other nodes. Those nodes may then be able to make greater payments
to the defaulted node, potentially lifting that node out of default, and precluding the existence
of an internally consistent set of payments.6
We avoid this difficulty through the definition of the default set in (8), based on p(1). In this
formulation, freed collateral does not become available until after payments have been made
and nodes have been declared in default. We have thus separated the payments process into
two rounds: a first round in which payments are made and collateral is seized as needed; and
a second round in which excess collateral and collateral posted to defaulted nodes becomes
available to the posting party to make other payments.
Obstacles to defining clearing payments arise in other extensions of Eisenberg and Noe [17]
as well. Elsinger [18] redefines clearing vectors to cover cross-holdings of debt and equity among
banks; David and Lehar [12] consider clearing payments when debt is subject to renegotiation;
Kusnetsov and Veraart [32] propose a detailed algorithm to handle debt with different matu-
rities; Jackson and Pernoud [30] note that clearing payments may not be well-defined when
banks buy credit protection on other banks, and Banerjee and Feinstein [3] similarly preclude
banks from speculating on other banks. None of these extensions fits our setting. Bichuch and
Feinstein [5] consider networks with collateral, but in their setting banks post collateral outside
the network to raise cash; in particular, they do not allow one bank to seize collateral posted
by another bank, which is a key feature of collateral in our setting.
In Figure 1, no collateral is seized because collateral is sitting at the wrong nodes to secure
payments due. For example, C owes A, but A has posted collateral to C. As a result, all
collateral is freed when the nodes default. Figure 2 shows the opposite configuration, with the
6Chang [9] develops a model in which borrowers may fail to recover collateral when a lender defaults because
the lender has in turn posted the collateral to another node. In our analysis, we assume nodes fully recover any
collateral to which they are entitled.
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Figure 2: The direction of collateral is reversed relative to Figure 1
direction of collateral postings reversed. All nodes default, all nodes seize collateral worth 5 to
cover the amount owed, and there are no remaining payment obligations. As in Figure 1, there
is no way to simultaneously define clearing payments and the default set: if all nodes default,
then all payments are covered, so no node defaults; if no node defaults, then no collateral is
seized, no payments are covered, so all nodes default.
The return or freeing of collateral in Figure 1 implicitly assumes that contracts with de-
faulted nodes are automatically terminated. Recall that margin mij is intended to cover future
potential losses on a contract (e.g., a swap), so it is possible to have margin posted when no
payment is due — that is, mik > 0 and p̄ik = p̄ki = 0. If node k defaults on its payments to
other nodes, the implications for node i are unclear. We assume (for now) that any contracts
between i and k are canceled and that posted collateral is returned: mik becomes available to
node i and mki becomes available to node k. We examine alternative assumptions on contract
termination and collateral access later.
Suppose the first round results in payments p
(1)
ij , i, j ∈ N . In other words, the p
(1)
ij satisfy
(6)–(9). If the payment due from i to j, p̄ij exceeds the payment p
(1)
ij , then node i enters the
second round with a remaining payment obligation to node j of
p̄
(2)
ij = p̄ij − p
(1)
ij . (11)
In Round 2, we deal with the allocation of remaining resources to meet remaining payment
obligations. These remaining resources result from freed collateral.
In the Eisenberg-Noe setting, (4) ensures that a node in default pays out all its cash. But
the use of collateral in Round 1 makes two types of resources potentially available at a defaulted
node in Round 2: a node may recover excess collateral committed to another node; and it may
recover freed collateral committed to a defaulting node, as a result of contract termination.
Figure 3 illustrates these mechanisms.7
7It is also possible for node i to default in Round 1 yet end the round holding cash, even before the return of
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Figure 3: Three initial configurations, each leaving A with cash. In the first network, excess
collateral is returned to A following A’s default; in the second network, contract termination
returns collateral to A; in the third network, A is left with cash despite defaulting on its payment
to B.
Example 2.2. Figure 3 shows three starting configurations. In the first network, A defaults,
B seizes collateral to cover missed payments from A, and excess collateral is returned to A,
allowing A to pay C. In the second network, C defaults on its obligation to B; C’s default
cancels its contract with A, freeing the collateral posted by A to C, leaving A with 5 in cash.
In the last network, A defaults, B seizes its collateral, and A is left with 4 units of cash, despite
having defaulted. See Section 2.4 for a discussion of full repayment following default.
The total collateral “returned” to node i after Round 1 is given by
ri =
{ ∑
j 6=i(mij −∆ij), i ∈ D;∑
j∈Dmij , i 6∈ D.
(12)
with D fixed by (8) in Round 1. If this freed collateral is insufficient to meet all of node i’s
remaining claims, payments are made in the proportions
a
(2)
ij = p̄
(2)
ij /
∑
k 6=i
p̄
(2)
ik , (13)
taking a
(2)
ij = 0 if the denominator is zero. Thus, we seek Round 2 payments satisfying
p
(2)
ij = p̄
(2)
ij ∧ a
(2)
ij
ri +∑
k 6=i
p
(2)
ki
 , i, j ∈ N . (14)
For later use, we record a relationship between the allocation fractions in the two rounds.
Lemma 2.1. If a
(2)
ij 6= 0 then a
(2)
ij = a
(1)
ij .
In the following, we use p
(`)
i =
∑
j p
(`)
ij , ` = 1, 2, to denote the total amount paid by node i
in each round.
collateral. However, in this case, we would have p̄
(2)
ij = 0 for all j and node i has no remaining payments. This
case is also illustrated in the figure.
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Proposition 2.1. For any collateral levels {mij , i, j ∈ N}, there exist clearing payments
(p(1), p(2)) satisfying (6)–(9) and (11)–(14). Moreover,
p
(1)
i + p
(2)
i = p̄i ∧
[
Ai(p
(1) + p(2)) +
∑
k 6=i
mik
]
, (15)
where
Ai(p
(1) + p(2)) = ci +
∑
k 6=i
(p
(1)
ki + p
(2)
ki ).
As our examples have illustrated, the existence of clearing payments depends on separating
the timing of payments due from the freeing of collateral: the default set D and returned
collateral ri are determined by the first-round payments p
(1). Without this separation, the
network will often fail to admit a consistent set of clearing payments. Equation (15) has a
simple interpretation: the total payments made by a node over two rounds equals the lesser
of the node’s total obligations and the node’s total cash, including collateral. However, (15)
does not extend to node-specific payments p
(1)
ij + p
(2)
ij because collateral is initially committed
to specific counterparties.
In subsequent sections, we will compare outcomes of networks under different policies re-
garding collateral and contracts. We will make these comparisons based on the sets of defaulting
nodes and the system-wide payment shortfall, which builds on the total payments in (15).
Definition 2.1. A network’s payment shortfall is the difference between payments due and
payments made, given by
L =
∑
i
(p̄i − p(1)i − p
(2)
i ) =
∑
i∈D
(p̄i − p(1)i − p
(2)
i ). (16)
For each node i that defaults, p̄i − p(1)i − p
(2)
i is the difference between i’s total payment
obligation and its total payments; if i does not default, then p̄i = p
(1)
i , p
(2)
i = 0, and its shortfall
is zero.
Table 1 shows the default sets and payment shortfalls for the examples in several figures.
In several cases, we have designed the examples to have L = 0 to highlight the effect of two
rounds of payments. In the first example of Figure 3, for instance, increasing node A’s payment
obligations from 9 to 10 + x would result in L = x, for any x ≥ 0, without changing D.
To see that our two rounds cannot be combined in general, consider an ordinary Eisenberg-
Noe network without collateral. Suppose that for some node i there exists a cash level c such
that i defaults if ci < c, and i does not default if ci > c. (We can see from (7) and (8) that such
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Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 5 Fig. 6
D = {A,B,C} D = {A,B,C} D = {A} D = {C} D = {A} D = {A} D = {A}
L = 0 L = 0 L = 0 L = 5 L = 0 L = 9 L = 5
Table 1: Default sets D and payment shortfalls L for examples in the figures. Figure 3 has
three examples.
thresholds will commonly exist.) Now introduce collateral and consider any proposed protocol
with the following two intended features: (i) collateral posted by a node is used towards the
node’s payment obligations if and only if that node defaults, and (ii) a node is deemed to
default if and only if it fails to meet its payment obligations. Such a protocol is not in general
consistent:
Proposition 2.2. Suppose
∑
jmij > c − ci > 0, and suppose mk` = 0, for all k 6= i. If node
i defaults, then it meets all its payment obligations; if node i does not default then it does not
meet all its payment obligations. In other words, no choice of default set D is consistent with
the protocol.
The proof of this claim is simple: If node i is deemed to default, then the resources ci +∑
jmij > c suffice to meet the node’s obligations, along with any cash received from other
nodes. If node i does not default, then the cash level ci < c does not suffice for i to make its
payments. In either case, we have a contradiction. Similar contradictions result from many
other configurations.
2.4 Default with Full Repayment
We have seen (as in Table 1) that it is possible for a node to default in the first round yet fully
meet its payment obligations by the end of the second round, eliminating its first-round shortfall.
In other words, a node may fail through illiquidity — a shortage of cash to meet payments due
— even if it is solvent, because some of its assets have been pledged as collateral. Indeed, the
major failures and near-failures of 2008 are generally understood as (at least initially) crises
of liquidity rather than solvency. Post-crisis regulation responded by introducing a liquidity
coverage ratio for banks as a complement to traditional capital requirements.
One may ask whether a default is costly if creditors are ultimately repaid. This question goes
to our definition of the default set, so we highlight two important practical considerations that
inform our modeling choice. First, a delay in payments can be costly because of its ripple effect
on downstream parties that rely on receiving those payments to meet their own obligations.
Delays can also lead to credit downgrades which then affect a node’s ability to borrow. Second,
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a delay that results in bankruptcy destroys franchise value; it locks a failed firm out of markets
that rely on a solid reputation for meeting payment obligations on time, and such a reputation is
not restored simply through eventual repayment. Nor are other costs of bankruptcy recovered.
The specifics of these mechanisms are beyond the scope of our model, but these considerations
explain why we treat first-round defaults as costly, even when second-round obligations are fully
met.
2.5 Networks with a Free Termination Option
As a benchmark, we consider a variant of our model in which nodes have the option to terminate
contracts in order to redeploy collateral they have posted. This termination option is exercised
whenever a node would otherwise default. We investigate other contract termination scenarios
more extensively in Sections 4 and 5.
To motivate this variant, consider the three networks in Figure 3. Suppose that node A
has the option to terminate any contract by using collateral posted to pay its counterparty,
recovering any remaining collateral. In the first case, this would mean paying 5 to B and
recovering 5; in the second case, paying zero to C and recovering 5; in the third case, paying 5
to B and recovering zero. In each case, A would avoid default.
We show in Appendix A.3 that this model can be reduced to a standard Eisenberg-Noe
model with lower payment obligations and adjusted cash balances in the following sense:
Lemma 2.2. Payments pij clear the network with collateral and free contract termination if
and only if payments pij−(mij∧p̄ij) clear the reduced Eisenberg-Noe network. The two networks
have the same default sets and payment shortfalls.
The reduced network is defined precisely in Appendix A.3. This result shows that collateral
plays no essential role in a network in which each node can recover collateral by terminating
contracts. With the option to terminate, posting collateral reduces to paying down certain
obligations. This result allows us to compare the collateralized networks of Sections 2.2–2.3
with otherwise identical networks that allow free contract termination:8
Proposition 2.3. Free contract termination reduces defaults but does not affect total payment
shortfalls.
8Here and in several subsequent results we are comparing two networks defined by fixed-point equations. To
account for the possibility of multiple fixed points, the comparison should be understood to hold for the largest
fixed points of the two networks and for the smallest fixed points. The existence of largest and smallest fixed
points follows from applications of Tarski’s fixed-point theorem. These issues are discussed in greater detail in
the proofs of the relevant results.
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This comparison confirms the natural intuition that collateral trapped in the “wrong” places
will increase defaults (because it is not immediately available to meet payment obligations) but
not affect eventual payments (because excess collateral is eventually returned and deployed to
make payments).
The free-termination model is useful for illustration, but it overlooks two key points. First,
parties to swaps and similar contracts do not ordinarily have the right to terminate contracts
unilaterally9 but must pay for that option by, for example, buying a swaption. The issue of
termination near default can be particularly contentious, a point we return to in Section 5.
Furthermore, in the second example of Figure 3, suppose we change A’s obligation to B to 8
and change C’s obligation to B to 3. Node A would like to terminate its contract with C to
recover its collateral. But C has no reason to agree and would like to extract a payment from
A. To avoid default, both nodes would like to keep at least 3 units of the 5 units of collateral.
The second key point missed by this model variant is the distinction between payments due
and contract values. Suppose node A has taken out a loan of 50 from node C and posted 5 in
collateral. In the middle example of Figure 3, no interest is due on the loan. But if A were to
terminate the contract to recover its collateral, it would need to repay the principal, dramatically
increasing its immediate payment obligations. The same can happen with a cross-currency
swap, which entails an exchange of principal at maturity. We consider these consequences of
contract termination in detail in Section 4. For these reasons, we work with the framework of
Sections 2.2–2.3 for the rest of the paper: collateral becomes accessible only following a default.
2.6 Collateral Pooling
In the examples of Figures 2 and 3, some defaults occur because collateral is tied up in the
“wrong” places. More precisely, some defaults could be avoided if nodes were able to hold
on to their collateral as cash, rather than commit it to specific counterparties. This points
to a tradeoff similar to the tradeoff between capital requirements and collateral requirements:
collateral provides a buffer against specific losses, whereas capital absorbs any type of loss.
Similar considerations apply in debates over “ring-fencing” capital to absorb losses in specific
jurisdictions as opposed to holding capital at the parent level.
These considerations might suggest that defaults and losses can be reduced by having all
nodes hold additional cash rather than post collateral. But that conclusion is incorrect because
changing the distribution of collateral changes the distribution of payments.
9Most OTC derivatives contracts are governed by an ISDA Master Agreement, which specifies the very limited
settings — primarily events of default by the counterparty — in which one party may terminate a contract. See
the discussion in Appendix B.
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Figure 4: Pooling collateral may increase or decrease payment shortfalls and the number of
defaults
Consider the example of Figure 4. The labels on the edges indicate payment obligations.
None of the nodes holds cash, but node A may have posted collateral to B1 or C1. We compare
defaults and shortfalls in the following scenarios:
cA = 0, mAB1 = 0, mAC1 = 2 : D = {A,B1, B2}, L = 6;
cA = 2, mAB1 = 0, mAC1 = 0 : D = {A,B1, B2, C1}, L = 5;
cA = 0, mAB1 = 2, mAC1 = 0 : D = {A,C1}, L = 4.
In the first scenario, collateral is committed to node C1. Holding the collateral as cash instead,
as indicated in the second scenario, results in a payment of 1 to each of B1 and C1. This
increases the number of defaults but it reduces systemwide payment shortfalls, which argues in
favor of pooling. But the third configuration, with collateral committed to node B1, yields the
fewest defaults and the smallest shortfall.
As this example illustrates, pooling collateral is not unambiguously better or worse than
committing it to specific counterparties. The comparison depends on the network and cannot
be resolved by considering a node in isolation.
The next result shows that pooling is preferable in two settings. To be precise, we need
some terminology. Let us say that one network is obtained from another by pooling collateral
if it results from one or more transformations of the form m′ij = mij − δ, c′i = ci + δ, δ ≤ mij .
By the excess collateral posted by node i to node j we mean [mij − p̄ij ]+. We say that the
network has proportional collateral if mij = kip̄ij , for some ki ∈ [0, 1], for all i and j. (The case
ki > 1 would be a special case of excess collateral.)
Proposition 2.4. (i) Pooling excess collateral reduces defaults and does not affect payment
shortfalls. (ii) Under proportional collateral, pooling that preserves proportionality reduces de-
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faults and does not affect payment shortfalls.
This proposition and the example of Figure 4 together suggest that pooling is unambigu-
ously better (in reducing defaults and shortfalls) only under special conditions. A proportional
collateral rule (like a fixed loan-to-value ratio) is found in some circumstances, but it is not
applicable with derivative contracts that carry different levels of risk or when payment obliga-
tions are not known precisely at the time collateral is posted. Excess collateral is applicable to
derivative contracts as collateral in the form of initial margin can exceed current contractual
payment obligations. Since initial margin in part captures extreme potential future exposures,
it can exceed current payments, making the excess collateral condition particularly relevant to
OTC derivatives markets.
3 Illiquid Collateral and Fire Sales
In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, we implicitly treated collateral as cash: if node j seizes collateral
∆ij from node i, node i’s payment obligation is reduced by exactly ∆ij . In the non-cleared
derivatives market, a wide range of less liquid securities, including corporate bonds, foreign-
denominated bonds, and equities are accepted as collateral, and these types of securities are
also used as collateral in repurchase agreements.
In this section, we extend our earlier analysis to incorporate the use of less liquid collateral.
When a creditor seizes collateral, it must sell the collateral to recover cash. Selling less liquid
collateral drives down its price, spreading losses to other holders of similar assets. Moreover,
if excess collateral is available, the creditor has no incentive to sell at the best possible price,
making the risk of a fire sale particularly acute.
Indeed, collateral liquidity is at the heart of debates over contract termination rights and
bankruptcy stays that motivate our investigation. As explained, for example, in Roe and
Adams [34], p.366, the purpose of bankruptcy stays is to avoid the value destruction and fire
sales that would occur if creditors were allowed to cease and sell a failing firm’s illiquid collateral.
Regulators and industry participants continue to debate the extent to which less liquid collateral
should be allowed for derivatives and repo, and whether the nature of the collateral necessitates
different restrictions on contract termination and rules on stays.
3.1 Round 1 Revisited
As a first step, we reformulate the analysis of Sections 2.2–2.3 to incorporate illiquidity. We now
take mij to be the shares of collateral committed by node i to node j for an asset with price π,
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making mijπ the value of the collateral. The case considered in Sections 2.2–2.3 corresponds to
a constant value π = 1. In this section, the price starts at 1 but falls as collateral is liquidated.
We posit that π is a strictly decreasing function G(1,∆) of the total shares sold, ∆, the first
argument of G indicating the initial price of 1. To be concrete, we set
π = G(1,∆) ≡ e−α∆, (17)
for some α ≥ 0. A larger α corresponds to a less liquid asset. This choice of price-impact
function is also used in Cifuentes et al. [10]; Amini et al. [1] discuss conditions on α.
We make the simplifying assumption that all collateral is held in a single illiquid asset.
Assigning different prices and price-impact functions to different collateral assets would com-
plicate notation without significantly changing our analysis. Assuming a single illiquid asset
for all collateral overstates the effect of fire sales, but the overstatement can be offset through
a smaller value of α. The choice of α should reflect the average price impact across different
types of collateral and the imperfect correlation in price impact across different securities.
As in (7) and (8), we have
A
(1)
i = ci +
∑
k
p
(1)
ki , D = {i : A
(1)
i <
∑
k
p̄ik}, (18)
but the payments in A
(1)
i received by node i will now reflect the market price of the collateral
asset. If node i defaults and node j seizes collateral mij with price π, node j now holds a
residual claim of (p̄ij−πmij)+ against node i, reflecting the market value πmij of the collateral
available. Node i’s assets are allocated to other nodes in proportion to the values of these
claims, so we replace (6) with
a
(1)
ij = (p̄ij − πmij)
+/
∑
k 6=i
(p̄ik − πmik)+. (19)
Example 3.1. Figure 5 illustrates the difference between allocation proportions (6) and (19).
Node A has 6 in cash and 20 in payment obligations, so it defaults. Node B seizes the 5 shares
of the collateral asset posted by A. The 6 in cash held by A is divided between B and C. Under
(6), B would be allocated a proportion (10− 5)/15 = 1/3, and C a proportion 2/3. Under (19),
node B claims a proportion (10− 5π)/(20− 5π), which is a decreasing function of the price π
at which B sells collateral it seized from A; the allocation proportions depend on the market
price of the collateral asset.
With asset price π > 0, the shares of collateral seized and sold by node j upon the default
of node i are given by
∆ij =
{
mij ∧ p̄ijπ ; i ∈ D;
0, i 6∈ D, (20)
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Figure 5: After A defaults, B seizes its collateral, and A’s 6 units of cash are divided between
B and C.
which reduces to (5) with π = 1. Dividing by π in (20) converts the dollar obligation p̄ij into
the number of shares required to cover the payment at the current market price. For π = 0,
interpret (20) as ∆ij = mij if p̄ij > 0 and ∆ij = 0 otherwise. The total shares of collateral
liquidated are given by
∆ =
∑
i
∑
j
∆ij , (21)
and the sale of these shares will drive down the price through (17). We modify (9) by seeking
clearing payments p(1) and an asset price π(1) satisfying
p
(1)
ij =
{
p̄ij ∧ [π(1)mij + a(1)ij A
(1)
i ], i ∈ D;
p̄ij , i 6∈ D,
(22)
together with (17)–(21).
3.2 Round 2 Revisited
Suppose that Round 1 clears with payments p(1) and asset price π(1). Define ri as in (12), and
interpret it as the number of shares of collateral freed or returned to node i. As in (11), node
i’s remaining obligation to node j is given by p̄
(2)
ij = p̄ij − p
(1)
ij .
To meet its remaining obligations p̄
(2)
ij , node i will liquidate some or all of its freed collateral,
which will further drive down the price of the shares. Given second-round payments p
(2)
ij and a
second-round share price π(2) > 0, the number of shares liquidated by node i is given by
Γi = ri ∧
1
π(2)
∑
j 6=i
p̄
(2)
ij −
∑
j 6=i
p
(2)
ji
 . (23)
The expression in parentheses is the difference between node i’s remaining payment obligations
and the second-round payments it receives; dividing by π(2) yields the number of shares of
collateral required to make up this shortfall; but node i cannot liquidate more than the ri
shares it recovers. The total amount liquidated by all nodes is Γ =
∑
i Γi, driving the price to
π(2) = G(π(1),Γ) = π(1)e−αΓ. (24)
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To clear Round 2, we need payments p(2) and a price π(2) satisfying
p
(2)
ij = p̄
(2)
ij ∧ a
(2)
ij
∑
k 6=i
p
(2)
ki + π
(2)ri
 , (25)
together with (23)–(24), and a
(2)
ij as in (13). The following result ensures the existence of
clearing payments and compares networks with liquid and illiquid collateral.
Proposition 3.1. There exist clearing payments and prices (p(1), π(1)) and (p(2), π(2)) for
Rounds 1 and 2 with illiquid collateral.
Two features in particular distinguish this result from other network models with fire sales,
such as Cifuentes et al. [10], Braouezec and Wagalath [7], and Cont and Schaanning [11]: one
is the need to split the payments into two rounds because of the collateral, and the second is
the fact that the proportions (19) depend on the collateral price π. Both features lead to more
involved arguments for the existence of clearing payments and prices. The source of the fire
sale is also different. In prior work, the fire sale is driven by banks selling their own assets to
meet capital requirements; in our setting, the fire sale is driven by creditors selling collateral to
recover payment shortfalls.
Our next result compares networks with liquid and illiquid collateral. In stating the result,
we need to account for the possibility that each network admits multiple sets of clearing pay-
ments. We will show that each network has a largest and smallest set of first-round and total
payments (p(1), p(1) + p(2)). The following comparison should be understood to hold for the
largest and smallest solutions of networks with liquid and illiquid collateral:
Proposition 3.2. Collateral illiquidity increases defaults and the total payment shortfall.
3.3 Collateral Fire Sale and Contagion
Our model formulation in Sections 2.2 and 3.1 assumed that, upon a default in Round 1,
collateral is seized first and partial payments are made second. For comparison, in this section
we consider an alternative formulation in which access to collateral is delayed and partial
payments are made first. Within Round 1, we reverse the order of collateral seizure and partial
payments; Round 2 proceeds as before. This reversal may be interpreted as the result of an
automatic stay, in which a defaulting node’s counterparties are prevented from immediately
seizing and liquidating collateral. (We discuss stays in greater detail in Section 5.) We give
an example here and leave the details for Appendix A.7. We show there that in the absence
of fire sales the total payments made from one node to another remain unchanged under this
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Figure 6: Nodes B and C hold collateral posted by A. Under the payments-first protocol, A
pays 8 to B before collateral is seized. Under the collateral-first protocol, A pays 5 to B after
collateral is seized.
protocol, even though the mix of collateral and cash payments may change. With illiquid
collateral, delaying collateral liquidation reduces systemwide losses and defaults.
Figure 6 illustrates the result. Node A defaults because its cash level 8 falls below its
payment obligations of 20. Under the collateral-first protocol, nodes B and C seize and liquidate
the collateral posted by A, which is mAB = 5 and mAC = 10. Applying (10) with a
(1)
AB = 1 and
a
(1)
AC = 0, node A makes a cash payment of 5 to node B in addition to the collateral transfer
of 5. The total first-round payments are p
(1)
AB = p
(1)
AC = 10, and there are no second-round
payments. Under the payments-first protocol, node A first makes a cash payment of 8 to node
B, again because a
(1)
AB = 1 and a
(1)
AC = 0. Node C liquidates mAC = 10 shares of collateral,
but node B liquidates only 2 shares and returns 3 to node A. The total first-round payments
are q
(1)
AB = q
(1)
AC = 10, and there are no second-round payments. However, the total amount of
collateral liquidated has been reduced from 15 to 12.
As in this example, the analysis of Appendix A.7 shows that when collateral is held in
cash-like assets, the spread of losses through the network is unaffected by the order of collateral
seizure and partial payments. However, as the example suggests, the collateral-first protocol
results in greater collateral liquidation. As a consequence, the collateral-first protocol can result
in greater losses when collateral is illiquid.
If we interpret the payments-first protocol as the result of an automatic stay on collateral
seizure by the counterparties to a failed node, then this observation is in line with policy
recommendations of Duffie and Skeel [15] and the subsequent finalized stay rule on collateral
sale in repo markets. The stay rule allows immediate seizure and liquidation of collateral only
if it is held in cash or cash-like assets.
4 Accelerated Payment Obligations from Contract Termination
A financial firm’s failure to make a payment due on one contract may trigger the termination
of other contracts on which no payments are due. This is particularly true in over-the-counter
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derivatives markets. OTC derivative contracts often provide participants the right to terminate
a contract if the counterparty enters bankruptcy, even if the counterparty has met all obligations
under the contract. Bankruptcy courts also provide failed firms certain rights to terminate
contracts. Upon termination, the market value of a swap or other derivative contract becomes
due from the out-of-the-money party to the in-the-money party; in this sense, a default can
accelerate payment obligations that would not otherwise be due.
In this section, we augment the model of Section 3 to incorporate this feature. We will show
that accelerated payments from contract termination can create inconsistencies in a network
model similar to those we encountered with collateral. We again resolve these complications
by carefully specifying the timing of events. Whereas clearing a network with collateral could
require two rounds, addressing contract termination may require as many rounds as there
are nodes, because each round of terminations may trigger further defaults and thus further
terminations. In this section, we assume that all contracts with a node are terminated upon
the node’s default; in the next section, we address selective termination.
Let
vij = positive value to node j of its derivative contracts with node i.
Under full contract termination, the default of node i triggers the termination of its derivatives;
at termination, node i incurs an obligation to pay node j the outstanding value vij , if vij > 0.
If however vji > 0, then the default of i triggers a payment obligation of vji from j to i. We
assume that all contracts between i and j are fully netted, so vijvji = 0.
Whereas the p̄ij represent payments due under ordinary circumstances (including, for exam-
ple, routine payments on swap contracts), the vij represent asset (vji > 0) or liability (vij > 0)
values for node i that turn into payment obligations only upon contract termination. If all
derivatives were subject to daily settlement (like futures contracts) then all changes in market
values would be offset by daily payments and we would always have vij = vji = 0. In practice,
the balance sheets of large banks show significant derivatives assets and liabilities, indicating
that not all contracts are settled daily.
The contingent payment obligations created by contract termination create some of the
same complications we saw previously, as the following example illustrates:
Example 4.1. Consider a three-node network with
p̄12 = 4, p̄13 = 2, p̄32 = 2, c1 = c2 = 4.
All other model parameters are zero, except for the termination values, which we specify shortly.
Node 1 defaults as its cash, c1 = 4, falls below its required payments to nodes 2 and 3. Node
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1 pays p12 = a12c1 = 4/6 × 4 ≈ 2.67 to node 2, and p13 = 2/6 × 4 ≈ 1.33 to node 3. Node 3
defaults as the payment of p32 = 1.33 it makes to node 2 is less than p̄32 = 2. Prior to contract
termination, node 2 does not have any payment obligations.
Suppose v21 = 2 and v13 = v23 = 0. Node 2, with cash of c2 + p12 + p32 = 8, pays v21 = 2 to
node 1. With this influx of cash, node 1 can now fully meet its payment obligations to nodes
2 and 3. In other words, node 1 can make all payments due, apparently avoiding default, but
only if it defaults! This example shows that it is not always possible to simultaneously specify a
consistent set of payments and default designations with automatic contract termination, even
without collateral.
To resolve this type of inconsistency, we separate payments into rounds as we did before,
consistent with the sequence of events described informally in Example 4.1. However, each
round of contract terminations can now potentially trigger additional payment obligations and
therefore additional defaults. In a network with N nodes, we may have up to N rounds of
defaults and N rounds of payments.
As in Section 3.3, we include the sale of any collateral in the total payment from node i to
node j and denote this total payment by pij . We assume the network follows the collateral-first
protocol of Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Perhaps most importantly, was assume that if node i defaults
in Round `, then any termination values vij or vji triggered by this default become payment
obligations in Round ` + 1. This timing is consistent with the interpretation of accelerated
obligations as consequences of default rather than causes of default.
Round 1
Round 1 proceeds exactly as in Section 3.1. The first-round quantities p
(1)
ij , π
(1), A
(1)
i , D, a
(1)
ij ,
and ∆(1) ≡ ∆ are defined by equations (17)–(22).
Subsequent Rounds
We now consider round m, 2 ≤ m ≤ N . With c(1)i = ci, the cash available to node i at the
beginning of the round is given by
c
(m)
i = c
(m−1)
i +
∑
k 6=i
p
(m−1)
ki −
∑
k 6=i
p
(m−1)
ik ,
with p̄
(1)
ik = p̄ik. We will let D
(l) denote the set of nodes that default in round l (and not before)
and define Sn to be the set of nodes that survive rounds 1, . . . , n,
Sn = {i : i /∈
n⋃
l=1
D(l)},
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with 1 ≤ n ≤ N , and S0 = N . Payment obligations in round m are defined by
p̄
(m)
ij =

vij + p̄
(m−1)
ij − p
(m−1)
ij , i or j ∈ D(m−1), and i, j ∈ Sm−2;
p̄
(m−1)
ij − p
(m−1)
ij , i or j /∈ Sm−2;
0, i, j ∈ Sm−1.
(26)
In each round, any previous payment obligation p̄
(m−1)
ij is reduced by any payment made p
(m−1)
ij .
A default by either node in the previous round creates the additional obligation vij from contract
termination. If both nodes have survived to the current round, then the original payment
obligation p̄ij was met in the first round and no subsequent obligation has been introduced, so
the remaining obligation is zero.
As in Section 2.3, defaults in the previous round may free collateral in the current round.
Recovered shares of collateral in round m are given by
r
(m)
i =
{∑
j∈Sm−2 [mij −∆
(m−1)
ij ], i ∈ D(m−1);∑
j∈D(m−1) mij , i ∈ Sm−1.
The number of shares of collateral posted by i that are seized and liquidated by j in round m
is given by
∆
(m)
ij =
mij ∧ p̄
(m)
ij
π(m)
, i ∈ D(m), and j ∈ Sm−1;
0, otherwise.
(27)
Given total payments p
(m)
ij and a share price π
(m), let
A
(m)
i = c
(m)
i + π
(m)r
(m)
i +
∑
k 6=i
p
(m)
ki (28)
denote the value of node i’s remaining cash and seized and returned collateral. The set of nodes
that default in the mth round is given by
D(m) = {i : i ∈ Sm−1, and A(m)i <
∑
k 6=i
p̄
(m)
ik }. (29)
Set
a
(m)
ij = [p̄
(m)
ij − π
(m)∆
(m)
ij ]/
∑
k 6=i
[p̄
(m)
ik − π
(m)∆
(m)
ik ].
Clearing payments in round m must satisfy
p
(m)
ij = p̄
(m)
ij ∧ [π
(m)∆
(m)
ij + a
(m)
ij A
(m)
1 ]. (30)
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The number of shares of returned collateral liquidated by node i is given by10
Γ
(m)
i = r
(m)
i ∧
1
π(m)
[∑
j 6=i
p̄
(m)
ij −
(
c
(m)
i +
∑
k 6=i
p
(m)
ki
)]
. (31)
With the totals
Γ(m) =
∑
i
Γ
(m)
i and ∆
(m) =
∑
i
∑
j
∆
(m)
ij (p
(m), π(m)),
the amount of collateral liquidated in round m drives the price to
π(m) = G(π(m−1),Γ(m) + ∆(m)) = π(m−1)e−α(Γ
(m)+∆(m)). (32)
Proposition 4.1. For any levels of derivatives values {vij , i, j ∈ N}, there exist clearing pay-
ments and prices (p(m), π(m)), m = 1, . . . , N .
With the benefit of this result, we can revisit Example 4.1. Nodes 1 and 3 do indeed default
in Round 1; their first-round payments are p
(1)
12 = 8/3, and p
(1)
13 = 4/3. The default of node 1
creates a new payment obligation v21 for node 2; the second-round payments are p
(2)
21 = v21 = 2,
p
(2)
12 = 4/3, and p
(2)
13 = 2/3. At the end of the second round, all payment obligations have been
met.
5 Bankruptcy Stays and Selective Termination
The pros and cons of OTC derivative contract termination at bankrutpcy have been debated
since the 1990s, and the matter has received renewed attention since the failure of Lehman
Brothers. We provide some background before adapting our model to consider some of the key
tradeoffs.
Most creditors in bankruptcy are subject to a stay that prevents them from seizing assets
of a bankrupt entity. This provision is intended to improve the chances that the debtor will
return to viability or to maximize the value of the debtor’s assets to repay creditors. Derivatives
and certain other financial contracts have long been exempt from these stays. As explained in
Chapter 9 of Skeel [38], the exemption was introduced to reduce the risk of spillovers upon the
failure of a financial firm by giving special protections to derivatives counterparties.
Since the failure of Lehman Brothers, regulators have come to have a different perspec-
tive, seeing termination rights as potentially destabilizing. Fleming and Sarkar [22] report that
10In formulating Γ
(m)
i , we have made the reasonable assumption that banks use their liquid assets before selling
illiquid returned collateral. If the order is reversed, Γ
(m)
i becomes r
(m)
i ∧
∑
j 6=i p̄
(m)
ij /π
(m).
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Lehman’s derivatives counterparties selectively terminated contracts where they stood to gain,
but maintained contracts where termination would have resulted in a payment to Lehman, a
practice often referred to as cherry-picking.11 The FDIC [19] reported that contract termina-
tions by Lehman’s counterparties caused market disruptions and left Lehman exposed to greater
market risk. In 2017, the Federal Reserve [20] adopted rules placing some limits on termination
of derivatives or, more precisely, qualified financial contracts (QFCs). In explaining the need
for an automatic stay on terminations, the Federal Reserve [20], p.42883, noted the risk of a
“chain reaction” of failures and the risk of fire sales from the liquidation of large volumes of
collateral assets.12
To capture the phenomenon of creditor cherry-picking — which we refer to as selective
termination — we modify the framework of Section 4. We assume that upon the failure of node
i, all amounts vij become due, but amounts vji do not come due (unless node j also defaults).
In other words, if node j survives when node i fails, node j terminates contracts that trigger
obligations from node i, but not contracts that trigger obligations to node i. We will compare
defaults and payment shortfalls under full termination and selective termination.13
5.1 Full Versus Selective Contract Termination
We detailed the full termination model in Section 4. In contrasting the two scenarios, we will use
the following notation for the full termination (FT) and selective termination (ST) models:14
p
(`)
ij , p̄
(`)
ij , π
(`): payments, payment obligations, and collateral prices in the FT model;
q
(`)
ij , q̄
(`)
ij , π̂
(`): payments, payment obligations, and collateral prices in the ST model;
11As explained in Skeel and Jackson [39], debtors may engage in their own form of cherry-picking. With the
protection of a bankruptcy stay, a debtor may decide which contracts to “assume” and which to “reject.” Skeel
and Jackson [39] also explain that this optionality is consistent with the treatment of “executory” contracts in
non-financial bankruptcies.
12Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and the resolution framework of FDIC (in coordination with the Federal
Reserve and OCC) impose a 1-2 day stay for QFC counterparties of the most complex U.S. bank holding
companies (U.S. G-SIBs). Under the U.S. Treasury’s proposed chapter 14 bankruptcy process, termination
rights of QFC counterparties will be stayed for 2 days (U.S. Treasury Report [44]). That is, automatic stays for
QFCs can be in place both in bankruptcy and in resolutions proceedings.
13Although we interpret selective termination as the result of creditor cherry-picking, a similar outcome would
result if the failed node chose to terminate all its out-of-the-money contracts. This possibility is noted in Skeel
and Jackson [39], p.181. By terminating these contracts, a failed node could force its counterparties to accept
lower payments through bankruptcy proceedings.
14Our use of q and π̂ in this section should not be confused with their use in Section 3.3. In both cases, we
use q and π̂ to indicate an alternative to a model that uses p and π.
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The evolution of the ST model is identical to that of the FT model with one exception: in place
of (26), the payment obligations become
q̄
(m)
ij =

vij + q̄
(m−1)
ij − q
(m−1)
ij , i ∈ D(m−1), and i, j ∈ Sm−2;
q̄
(m−1)
ij − q
(m−1)
ij , i or j /∈ Sm−2;
0, i, j ∈ Sm−1.
(33)
Only the first case has changed: the obligation vij is added only if i defaults.
By construction, the FT and ST models are identical in Round 1, so they admit the same
sets of clearing payments p
(1)
ij and q
(1)
ij . Moreover, under selective termination, a node that
survives Round 1 has no payment obligations in Round 2, so no defaults occur after Round 1,
and the process terminates at the end of Round 2. By the argument used for Proposition 4.1,
we have the following result:
Proposition 5.1. For any levels of derivatives values {vij , i, j ∈ N}, there exist clearing pay-
ments and prices (q(1), π̂(1)) and (q(2), π̂(2)). The feasible clearing payments and collateral prices
in Round 1 under the ST and FT models coincide, and thus so do the first round payment short-
falls. The ST default set is a subset of the FT default set.
Because the two models agree in the first round, they produce the same defaults in Round
1; and because the ST model has no subsequent defaults, full termination always produces at
least as many defaults as selective termination. The comparison of payment shortfalls is less
clear. Full termination creates additional payment obligations and thus more opportunities for
payments to fall short; but full termination can also increase the flow of payments, potentially
offsetting the first effect.
To formulate the comparison precisely, we use the notation in (29) to denote the total default
sets for the two models (full and selective termination) by
Df =
m⋃
l=1
D(l), Ds = D(1). (34)
We define payment shortfalls for the two models as differences between payments due and
payments made,
Lf =
∑
i∈Df
(vi + p̄i − pi), and Ls =
∑
i∈Ds
(vi + p̄i − qi), (35)
where pi =
∑m
l=1 p
(l)
i , qi = q
(1)
i +q
(2)
i , and vi =
∑
j 6=i vij . These shortfall measures are calculated
relative to payments currently due — which is the relevant focus in a moment of market stress
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Figure 7: Network of Example 5.1. The dashed-line payment from node 0 to node 1 becomes
due only upon contract termination. Nodes 1, . . . , N + 1 have no cash.
or a crisis following defaults — and ignore future obligations. The total payments due in the
FT case are always at least as large as in the ST case, but the comparison of shortfalls can go
either way, as the following example illustrates.
Example 5.1. Consider the linear network of Figure 7 with nodes labeled 0, 1, . . . , N + 1.
Nodes i = 1, . . . , N have payments due to their successor nodes, p̄i,i+1 = d. Node 0 has a
potential obligation v01 = d. Node 0 holds c0 in cash; no other nodes have cash. In Round 1,
nodes 1, . . . , N default. Under selective termination, nothing more happens; none of the Nd
payments due are made, so Ls = Nd.
Under full termination, the default of node 1 triggers termination of the contract between
0 and 1, creating a payment obligation p̄
(2)
01 = v01 = d. Node 0 pays (d ∧ c0) to node 1,
and this amount is passed through all downstream nodes. The payment shortfall becomes
Lf = (N + 1)d − (N + 1)(d ∧ c0) = (N + 1)(d − c0)+. By varing the parameters N and d, we
can make Lf = 0 and Ls arbitrarily large, but we can also make Lf − Ls arbitrarily large.
This example suggests the following properties: If full termination does not increase the set
of defaults, then it (weakly) lowers the payment shortfall, compared with selective termination.
Unless a node is exactly on the boundary of default, a sufficiently small increase in payment
obligations will not push it into default. Thus, for sufficiently small vij , we have L
f ≤ Ls;
but by increasing some vij we can make L
f − Ls arbitrarily large, so long as j defaults and
i does not. The key then to comparing payment shortfalls is to understand the magnitudes
of derivatives liabilities relative to node distances from their default boundaries. We interpret
these relative magnitudes as measures of derivatives leverage.
As a first step in formalizing these ideas, we show that full termination increases payments
when collateral value is constant. Recall that the ST and FT models coincide in Round 1.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose the collateral price is constant π = π̂ = 1. Then full termination and
selective termination models satisfy
p
(2)
ij ≥ q
(2)
ij , for all i, j ∈ N , (36)
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taking the smallest or largest clearing payments under each model.
In the proof of the lemma, we confirm that the smallest and largest clearing payments
are well-defined for the two models. We compare these extremal solutions to account for the
possibility of non-uniqueness. If each model has unique second-round clearing payments, then
(36) holds directly. In light of these considerations we will compare models under payments
satisfying either of the following conditions:
p(1) = q(1), π(1) = π̂(1), and p(2) and q(2) are the largest second round payments; (37)
p(1) = q(1), π(1) = π̂(1), and p(2) and q(2) are the smallest second round payments. (38)
When the ST and FT models produce the same default sets, the additional termination
obligations under the FT model must be fully met — otherwise, they would trigger additional
defaults. Combining this observation with Lemma 5.1 yields the following.
Corollary 5.1. Suppose either (37) or (38) holds and the collateral price is constant. If Df =
Ds then Lf ≤ Ls.
To build on this observation, we develop the notion of derivatives leverage introduced in-
formally above. Let ei denote the net worth of node i at the end of Round 1,
ei = ci + π
(1)ri +
∑
k 6=i
p
(1)
ki −
∑
k 6=i
p̄ik. (39)
Proposition 5.2. Suppose (37) or (38) holds. Full termination reduces payment shortfalls, in
the sense that Lf ≤ Ls, under the “aggregate derivatives leverage” condition∑
i∈Df−D(1)
vi ≤
∑
i∈Df−D(1)
ei, (40)
if either (i) the collateral price is constant π = π̂ = 1, or (ii) there is no excess collateral,
meaning that mij ≤ p̄ij, ∀i, j ∈ N .
We call (40) a derivatives leverage condition because it compares derivatives liabilities on
the left with a measure of equity on the right. A simple sufficient condition for (40) is vi ≤ ei,
for all i 6∈ D(1). This condition applies to Example 5.1. Only node 0 survives the first round,
and its net worth is e0 = c0. If c0 ≥ v0 = d, then Lf = 0 and thus Lf ≤ Ls. Condition (40)
also holds when Df = D(1), the case considered in Corollary 5.1.
To add some qualitative context to (40), we note that post-crisis capital and liquidity
regulations have significantly increased bank capital and liquidity levels. According to the U.S
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Department of the Treasury Report [42], p.37, large U.S. banks hold nearly 24% of their assets
in high-quality liquid assets such as cash and U.S. Treasury securities. We know from bank
regulatory reporting that derivatives transactions constitute a small portion of the balance
sheets of even the largest U.S. bank holding companies. These considerations suggest that the
cash demands from contract terminations are unlikely to topple an otherwise solvent bank,
favoring full termination over selective termination.
In defining the shortfall measure Ls in (35), we have not included contracts that have positive
value vki for a failed node i ∈ Ds, where k 6∈ Ds is a surviving node: under selective termination,
these contracts are not terminated and the payment obligations are not accelerated. To include
these quantities as payment shortfalls, we can define
Ls+ = Ls +
∑
k 6∈Ds
∑
i∈Ds
vki.
As Ls ≤ Ls+, we clearly have Lf ≤ Ls+ under the conditions of Proposition 5.2.
The following modification of Example 5.1 highlights the effect of collateral fire sales on the
total payment shortfalls under full and selective termination.
Example 5.2. We modify the linear network of Example 5.1 by setting c0 = 0 to remove node
0’s cash and introducing collateral shares m01 > 0 posted by node 0 to node 1. With a fixed
collateral price π ≡ 1 and m01 = c0, the shortfalls in this network are identical to those in
Example 5.1: following the first-round default of nodes 1, . . . , N , the collateral m01 is returned
to node 0, and node 0 pays d∧m01 to node 1 in the case of full termination; it pays nothing in
the case of selective termination.
Suppose m01 > d, so that node 0 could meet its obligation in the FT case if π ≡ 1,
resulting in Lf = 0. If the collateral is illiquid, its value will drop when node 0 sells collateral
shares. Applying (31) and (32), we find that the amount liquidated is Γ(2) = m01∧d/π(2), with
π(2) = exp(−αΓ(2)), so Γ(2) = m01 ∧ d exp(αΓ(2)). If m01 < d exp(αm01), then Γ(2) = m01 (all
shares are liquidated) and the amount node 0 pays to node 1 is π(2)m01 = m01 exp(−αm01) < d.
The resulting shortfall is Lf = (N + 1)(d −m01 exp(−αm01))+, whereas Ls = Nd. We thus
have Lf ≥ Ls for sufficiently large α. In other words, the illiquidity of the collateral can reverse
the order of the two shortfalls.
5.2 Comparison with No Termination
If we set aside the option for a bankrupt node to reject certain contracts, we can model an
automatic stay by supposing that no payments are accelerated at default. This no-termination
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scenario is equivalent to setting all vij = 0, which reduces to the model of Sections 2 and 3. We
compare no termination with full termination and selective termination.
We begin with the comparison between full termination and no termination. We continue to
use pij to denote clearing payments under the full termination protocol; in this section, we use
qij to denote clearing payments with no accelerated payments. The two scenarios coincide in
Round 1; and without contract terminations no defaults occur after Round 1, and no payments
are made after Round 2. We compare payments under the assumption that (37) or (38) holds,
applying these conditions to the new qij . The total payment shortfall in the no-termination
scenario is given by
Ln =
∑
i∈D(1)
(p̄i − qi),
with qi = q
(1)
i + q
(2)
i .
Proposition 5.3. Suppose that (37) or (38) holds. Suppose there is no excess collateral,
meaning that mij ≤ p̄ij, ∀i, j ∈ N . Then full termination results in the same default set
as no termination and lower payment shortfalls, Lf ≤ Ln, if the following condition holds:
vi ≤
{
ei, i 6∈ D(1);∑
k/∈D(1) vki, i ∈ D(1).
(41)
The comparison of full termination and no termination presents tradeoffs similar to those
in Section 5.1. Contract termination creates additional payment obligations, but it can also
increase the flow of cash to meet payment obligations. As in Proposition 5.2, the condition in
(41) can be interpreted as a constraint on derivatives leverage.
If we take the view that counterparties of a failed node will have to replace their contracts,
then we may define
Ln+ =
∑
i∈D(1)
(vi + p̄i − q̄i).
This shortfall measure includes the total value vi of node i’s outstanding contracts and thus
the replacement cost imposed on node i’s counterparties. Proposition 5.3 clearly applies with
Ln replaced by Ln+.
For the comparison of selective termination (creditor cherry-picking) and no termination,
we have the following simpler result. Recall that the two models coincide in Round 1.
Proposition 5.4. Suppose there is no excess collateral, meaning that mij ≤ p̄ij, ∀i, j ∈ N .
For any common set of first-round payments under selective termination and no termination,
we have Dn = Ds and Ln ≤ Ls.
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The network is unlikely to have excess collateral following a large shock. But if we drop
the assumption of no excess collateral, the comparison of shortfalls could go either way. For
example, suppose in Figure 7 that node 0 has a payment obligation to some other node A that it
cannot meet, and suppose node 0 has posted excess collateral to node A. That excess collateral
is returned to node 0 in Round 2. If node 1 selectively terminates its contract with node 0, this
creates a new payment obligation v01, potentially increasing the systemwide shortfall. But if
the excess collateral returned to node 0 is large, the contract termination will lead to additional
payments by nodes 1 through N , potentially reducing the systemwide shortfall.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper introduces a framework to study contagion in collateralized financial networks and
to analyze the effects of the contract termination rules that control access to collateral. We
compare alternative scenarios through their impact on the set of nodes that default and the
total payment shortfall. In a collateralized network, the failure of one firm may improve the
ability of other firms to meet their obligations. We show that this phenomenon makes the
problem of determining clearing payments ill-posed. We resolve this difficulty and arrive at
a well-defined set of clearing payments by carefully specifying the timing of payments and
collateral liquidation.
It is interesting to view our analysis through a regulatory lens. In its comparison of margin
requirements and capital requirements, BCBS-IOSCO [4] (p.4) writes that, margin can be seen
as offering enhanced protection [in comparison with capital] against counterparty credit risk
provided that it is effectively implemented. In order for margin to act as an effective risk
mitigant, it must be (i) accessible when needed and (ii) provided in a form that can be liquidated
rapidly and at a predictable price even in a time of financial stress. Our analysis of fire sales
reinforces the second point, and our baseline model of collateral presupposes that collateral is
accessible at default. But our results also show that even when (i) and (ii) hold, collateral
is not guaranteed to improve financial stability. Depending on how collateral is allocated to
counterparties, it can increase or decrease defaults and payment shortfalls. For instance, we
show that committing excess collateral may increase risks to financial stability. This result is
applicable with derivative contracts where initial margin can lead to collateral levels in excess
of current payment obligations. Moreover, a comparison of alternative policies on collateral
seizure requires consideration of a firm’s positions in a network of payment obligations and
cannot be made by considering a firm in isolation.
The same point — that the network matters — applies to the comparison of alternative
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rules on contract termination. The debate over stays on contract termination upon the failure
of a firm gained renewed attention after the failure of Lehman Brothers. Policies adopted earlier
argued that financial stability required protecting the termination rights of surviving counter-
parties; more recently, the regulatory consensus has argued that financial stability requires
limiting these rights. Our analysis compares systemwide losses and defaults under alternative
assumptions about contract termination. These comparisons require analyzing the network;
our results and examples show that none of the termination scenarios we consider is uniformly
better than the others in stemming losses.
We are able to make a stronger statement under a constraint on derivatives leverage in
the network. When this condition holds, full termination results in lower payment shortfalls
than selective termination or no termination. A reduction in derivatives leverage is consistent
with post-crisis increases in bank capital and a general decline in over-the-counter derivatives,
adding to the relevance of the condition we introduce.
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A Appendix: Supporting Analysis
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Write Si = {k : p(1)ik < p̄ik} for the set of nodes to which node i did not meet its payment
obligations in Round 1. If j 6∈ Si then a(2)ij = 0, so we may suppose j ∈ Si; in particular, Si
is nonempty. The sums in the denominators of a
(1)
ij and a
(2)
ij can be restricted to k ∈ Si. We
prove the result in the more general setting of Section 3, for which π(1) = π(2) = 1 is a special
case. For all k ∈ Si,
p
(1)
ik = π
(1)mik + a
(1)
ik A
(1)
i .
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Making this substitution in (11) and (13) and letting Ki denote the denominator of a
(1)
ij yields
a
(2)
ij =
p̄ij − π(1)mij − a(1)ij A
(1)
i∑
k∈Si(p̄ik − π
(1)mik − a
(1)
ik A
(1)
i )
=
(p̄ij − π(1)mij)(1−A(1)i /Ki)∑
k∈Si(p̄ik − π
(1)mik)(1−A
(1)
i /Ki)
= a
(1)
ij .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
The existence of clearing payments in this setting is a special case of the more general claim in
Proposition 3.1, which we prove separately. Here we prove (15).
The second-round payments in (14) satisfy p
(2)
ij ≤ p̄
(2)
ij = p̄ij−p
(1)
ij , using (11), so p
(1)
ij +p
(2)
ij ≤
p̄ij . Summing over j, we get
p
(1)
i + p
(2)
i ≤ p̄i. (42)
We will next show that the second term in (15) is also an upper bound,
p
(1)
i + p
(2)
i ≤ ci +
∑
k 6=i
(p
(1)
ki + p
(2)
ki ) +
∑
k 6=i
mik. (43)
The second-round payments in (14) have exactly the structure of Eisenberg-Noe [17] clearing
payments (4), with ri in (14) playing the role of ci in (4) and payment obligations given by
p̄
(2)
ij . Any node that did not default in the first round has no payment obligations in the second
round. As in Eisenberg-Noe [17], we may write the node totals as
p
(2)
i = p̄
(2)
i ∧
ri +∑
k 6=i
p
(2)
ki
 .
In other words, the minimum in (14) is either attained by the first term for all j or the second
term for all j. For i ∈ D, we can rewrite ri using (5) and (12) as ri =
∑
k(mik − p̄i)+. Making
this substitution and using (11), we get
p
(2)
i = [p̄i − p
(1)
i ] ∧
∑
k 6=i
(mik − p̄ik)+ +
∑
k 6=i
p
(2)
ki
 . (44)
From (10) we have
p
(1)
ik = (mik ∧ p̄ik) + (a
(1)
ik A
(1)
i ∧ p̄ik) ≤ (mik ∧ p̄ik) + a
(1)
ik A
(1)
i . (45)
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Summing both sides of (45) over k and recalling the definition of A
(1)
i in (7), we get
p
(1)
i ≤ ci +
∑
k 6=i
p
(1)
ki +
∑
k 6=i
(mik ∧ p̄ik). (46)
Adding (46) to (44) yields (43).
In light of (42) and (43), to prove (15), we need to show that
if p
(1)
i + p
(2)
i < p̄i then p
(1)
i + p
(2)
i = ci +
∑
k(p
(1)
ki + p
(2)
ki ) +
∑
kmik. (47)
We claim that if p
(1)
i + p
(2)
i < p̄i then equality holds in (45) and (10) can be written as
p
(1)
ik = (mik ∧ p̄ik) + a
(1)
ik A
(1)
i . (48)
To show this equivalence, we need to consider three cases. (i) If p̄ik ≤ mik, then (6) yields
a
(1)
ik = 0, so (10) and (48) both give p
(1)
ik = p̄ik. (ii) If p̄ik ≥ mik + a
(1)
ik A
(1)
i , then (10) and
(48) both give p
(1)
ik = mik + a
(1)
ik A
(1)
i . (iii) The remaining case is mik < p̄ik < mik + a
(1)
ik A
(1)
i ,
which is equivalent to 0 < p̄ik − mik < a
(1)
ik A
(1)
i . In light of the definition of a
(1)
ik in (6), this
implies
∑
j [p̄ij −mij ]+ < A
(1)
i . But this inequality says that following the seizure of collateral,
node i has sufficient remaining assets to meet all its residual claims, making p
(1)
ik = p̄ik, for all
k. Summing over k yields p
(1)
i = p̄i. Thus, under the condition p
(1)
i + p
(2)
i < p̄i, case (iii) is
precluded and (48) holds.
Summing over k in (48) we get equality in (46). Under the condition p
(1)
i +p
(2)
i < p̄i in (47),
the minimum in (44) is attained by the second term. Adding this term to the right side of (46)
yields the claimed result in (47).
A.3 Analysis of Free-Termination Model
We begin with a precise formulation of the model of Section 2.5. To capture the nodes’ access
to collateral, we need to set
Ai = ci +
∑
k 6=i
pki +
∑
k 6=i
[mik − p̄ik]+ ≡ cpi +
∑
k 6=i
pki. (49)
The term [mik − p̄ik]+ reflects excess collateral node i can call back from k to make payments
to other nodes. Node i defaults if Ai <
∑
k[p̄ik −mik]+; in other words, default is the failure
to meet uncollateralized obligations. We can write the default set as
Dp = {i : ci +
∑
k
pki +
∑
k
mik <
∑
k
p̄ik}. (50)
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Upon i’s default, node j’s share of any remaining assets is proportional to its residual claim, so
aij =
[p̄ij −mij ]+∑
k[p̄ik −mik]+
. (51)
Clearing payments are required to satisfy
pij = p̄ij ∧ [mij + aijAi]. (52)
Existence of (largest and smallest) clearing payments follows from Tarski’s fixed-point theorem.
To formulate the equivalent Eisenberg-Noe model, define reduced obligations
q̄ij = [p̄ij −mij ]+, (53)
and increased cash
cqi = ci +
∑
k
[mik − p̄ik]+ +
∑
k
(mki ∧ p̄ki).
The additional cash reflects collateral [mik − p̄ik]+ recovered by i and any paying down of
obligations to i using collateral posted by k, mki ∧ p̄ki. Set
Aqi = c
q
i +
∑
k 6=i
qki,
and notice that aij in (51) equals q̄ij/
∑
k q̄ik. With no collateral, the standard Eisenberg-Noe
condition for clearing payments becomes
qij = q̄ij ∧ aijAqi . (54)
We may rephrase the first statement of Lemma 2.2 as saying that payments qij satisfy (54) if
and only if payments pij = qij + (mij ∧ p̄ij) satisfy (52).
Proof of Lemma 2.2. If (54) holds, the substitutions qij = pij − (mij ∧ p̄ij) and (53) yield
pij − (mij ∧ p̄ij) = [p̄ij −mij ]+ ∧ aijAqi ,
so
pij = p̄ij ∧ [(mij ∧ p̄ij) + aijAqi ]
= p̄ij ∧ [mij + aijAqi ]. (55)
But
Aqi = ci +
∑
k
[mik − p̄ik]+ +
∑
k
(mki ∧ p̄ki) +
∑
k
qki
= ci +
∑
k
[mik − p̄ik]+ +
∑
k
pki = Ai,
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so (55) yields (52). Conversely, if (52) holds, then, as p̄ij = qij + (mij ∧ p̄ij), we have
qij + (mij ∧ p̄ij) = [q̄ij + (mij ∧ p̄ij)] ∧ [mij + aijAqi ],
so
qij = q̄ij ∧ [(mij − p̄ij)+ + aijAqi ] = q̄ij ∧ aijA
q
i ,
because if mij > p̄ij then q̄ij = 0. As A
q
i = Ai, (54) follows.
To see that the payment shortfalls coincide, observe that
q̄ij − qij = [p̄ij −mij ]+ − [pij − (mij ∧ p̄ij)] = p̄ij − pij .
The default sets coincide because qij < q̄ij if and only if pij < p̄ij .
Proof of Proposition 2.3. For the model with free termination, we can use cpi in (49) to rewrite
the clearing condition (52) as
pij = p̄ij ∧ [mij + aij(cpi +
∑
k
pki)]. (56)
This equation has exactly the same form as the first-round clearing payments in (10), but with
ci in (7) replaced by c
p
i . As c
p
i ≥ ci, it follows from Theorem 3 of Milgrom and Roberts [33] that
the largest and smallest fixed points of (56) are no smaller than, respectively, the largest and
smallest fixed points of (10). In other words, payments with free termination exceed first-round
payments in the original model. By comparing (8) and (50), we see that pki ≥ p
(1)
ki implies
Dp ⊆ D: free termination results in fewer defaults.
To compare payment shortfalls in the two models, we use equation (57), proved below, and
claim that we can replace ci + ri with c
p
i to write
p
(1)
ij + p
(2)
ij = p̄ij ∧
[
mij + a
(1)
ij
(
cpi +
∑
k
(p
(1)
ki + p
(2)
ki )
)]
.
If i 6∈ D, then p(1)ij = p̄ij , p
(2)
ij = 0 and there is nothing to show. If i ∈ D, then the returned
collateral is ri =
∑
k[mik − p̄ik]+, and indeed ci + ri = c
p
i . Comparison with (56) now shows
that total payments in the two systems coincide.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4
We first derive an expression for total payments p
(1)
ij +p
(2)
ij that is of independent interest. Using
Lemma 2.1, we can replace a
(2)
ij in (14) with a
(1)
ij , because if a
(2)
ij = 0 then p
(1)
ij = p̄ij , so p
(2)
ij = 0
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and is unchanged by the replacement. With this substitution and adding (10) and (14), we get
p
(1)
ij + p
(2)
ij = p̄ij ∧
([
p̄ij ∧ [mij + a(1)ij (ci +
∑
k
p
(1)
ki )
]
+ a
(2)
ij (ri +
∑
k
p
(2)
ki )
)
= p̄ij ∧
[
mij + a
(1)
ij
(
ci + ri +
∑
k
(p
(1)
ki + p
(2)
ki )
)]
. (57)
This expression does not quite reduce the two rounds to a single round because the returned
collateral ri is determined after the first round and is not an exogenous parameter. We now
turn to the two claims in the proposition.
(i) Removing excess collateral has no effect on Round 1 payments and no effect on which
nodes default. All excess collateral becomes returned collateral in Round 2. Replacing excess
collateral with cash increases ci by exactly the amount it decreases returned collateral ri, so we
can see from (57) that pooling excess collateral does not affect thet set of clearing payments
and therefore does not affect payment shortfalls. The increase in ci can, however, reduce the
default set, which is determined in Round 1.
(ii) Under proportional collateral, [p̄ij − mij ]+ = (1 − ki)p̄ij , so a(1)ij = p̄ij/
∑
k p̄ik, from
which it follows that mij = a
(1)
ij mi, with mi =
∑
jmij . Moreover, with ki ∈ [0, 1], there is no
excess collateral, so no defaulting node receives any returned collateral, meaning that a
(1)
ij ri = 0.
We may therefore write (57) as
p
(1)
ij + p
(2)
ij = p̄ij ∧ a
(1)
ij
(
mi + ci +
∑
k
(p
(1)
ki + p
(2)
ki )
)
.
As the total payments depend on mi and ci only through their sum, pooling while preserving
proportional collateral (increasing ci by decreasing ki) has no effect on payment shortfalls, but,
as before, increasing ci can reduce defaults.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.1
We begin with the analysis of first-round payments. Through an arbitrary ordering of pairs of
nodes, we can record the set of payments p
(1)
ij in a vector p
(1); interpret the vector p̄ accordingly.
If we take any π ∈ [0, 1] and p(1) ∈ [0, p̄] and plug these variables into the right side of (17)–
(22), then the variables on the left side of (17) and (22) return new values of π ∈ [0, 1] and
p(1) ∈ [0, p̄]. In other words, expressions (17)–(22) define a mapping F : (π, p(1))→ (π, p(1)) of
[0, 1]× [0, p̄] into itself.
Lemma A.1. F is monotone increasing.
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Proof. In (22) we see that p
(1)
ij is monotone increasing in A
(1)
i and therefore monotone increasing
in p
(1)
ki , k 6= i. Now consider p
(1)
ij as a function of π. If i 6∈ D, then p
(1)
ij ≡ p̄ij , and changing π
has no effect on p
(1)
ij . For i ∈ D, we consider three cases.
Case 1. A
(1)
i <
∑
k(p̄ij −πmik)+ and p̄ik > πmij . In this case, (22) yields a right derivative of
∂p
(1)
ij
∂π
= mij −
mijA
(1)
i∑
k(p̄ik − πmik)+
+
(p̄ij − πmij)+A(1)i
∑
kmik1{p̄ik > πmik}
[
∑
k p̄ik − πmik)+]
2 . (58)
The second term on the right is less than mij because we have assumed A
(1)
i <
∑
k(p̄ik−πmik)+.
The third term is nonnegative, and the derivative is then as well. A small increase in π yields
an increase in p
(1)
ij .
Case 2. A
(1)
i ≥
∑
k(p̄ik − πmik)+ and p̄ik > πmij . These conditions imply p
(1)
ij = p̄ij , and they
are preserved under a small increase in π, so ∂p
(1)
ij /∂π = 0.
Case 3. p̄ik ≤ πmij . In this case, p
(1)
ij = p̄ij , so ∂p
(1)
ij /∂π = 0.
As π increases, we may transition into Case 2 or Case 3. Either transition yields p
(1)
ij = p̄ij ,
so monotonicity holds.
It remains to show that (17) makes π on the left an increasing function of all p
(1)
ij and π
on the right. Monotonicity in π is immediate from the monotonicity of G. An increase in p
(1)
ij
leads the default set D to contract or remain unchanged, resulting in a decrease in ∆ and an
increase in π.
By Tarski’s fixed point theorem, Lemma A.1 implies that F has a fixed point in [0, 1]× [0, p̄],
which delivers the required clearing payments and collateral price. The following lemma will
ensure that a fixed point is reached through iterative application of F , starting from the upper
boundary of this domain.
Lemma A.2. F is continuous from the right; that is, for any decreasing convergent sequence
(π`, p`)→ (π∗, p∗), we have F (π`, p`)→ F (π∗, p∗).
Proof. Equations (17)–(22) imply that p
(1)
ij is continuous in p
(1) and π, and (17) implies π on
the left is continuous in π on the right. A change in p(1) may produce a change in D and thus
a discontinuity in π. However, a small increase in p(1) preserves the inequalities defining the
default set in (18), leaving D unchanged and implying right-continuity of π in p(1).
We can now conclude the proof of Proposition 3.1. By Lemma A.1, the iterates of F starting
from (1, p̄) form a decreasing sequence F (π`, p`) = (π`+1, p`+1). This sequence is bounded is
below by (0, 0) and therefore has a limit (π∗, p∗). Thus, F (π`, p`)→ (π∗, p∗). But Lemma A.2
implies that F (π`, p`)→ F (π∗, p∗). We conclude that F (π∗, p∗) = (π∗, p∗).
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This fixed point provides a first-round price and clearing vector (π(1), p(1)). The existence
of (π(2), p(2)) now follows by a similar but simpler argument. Expressions (23)–(25) define a
mapping from (π(2), p(2)) on the right to (π(2), p(2)) on the left. The mapping is clearly monotone
increasing and continuous, and it maps [0, 1]× [0, p̄(2)] into itself. It therefore has a fixed point,
and the fixed point delivers the required solution (π(2), p(2)).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The existence of a largest (and smallest) first-round solution follows from Tarski’s fixed point
theorem and the monotonicity of F in Lemma A.1. By Theorem 3 of Milgrom and Roberts
[33], the monotonicity of F in π(1) implies that the largest and smallest p(1) are smaller with
illiquid collateral (π(1) ≤ 1) than with liquid collateral (π(1) = 1). This implies that the default
set is larger with illiquid collateral.
With illiquid collateral, the argument leading to (57) yields
p
(1)
ij + p
(2)
ij = p̄ij ∧
[
π(1)mij + a
(1)
ij
(
ci + π
(2)ri +
∑
k
(p
(1)
ki + p
(2)
ki )
)]
(59)
≡ p̄ij ∧
[
π(1)mij + a
(1)
ij Ãi
]
. (60)
With this representation, we may write (p(1), π(1), p(1)+p(2), π(2)) = (F (p(1), π(1)), F̃ (p(1), π(1), p(1)+
p(2), π(2))), with F as in Lemma A.1, and F̃ defined by (60) and (24).
In (60), Ãi is increasing in p
(1)+p(2), in π(2), and in ri, which is increasing in π
(1). Moreover,
(60) has the same form as (22), so the argument in Lemma A.1 shows that F̃ is monotone
increasing. It follows from Tarski’s fixed point theorem that the mapping defined by (F, F̃ )
has a largest and smallest fixed point. By Theorem 3 of Milgrom and Roberts [33], with
π(1), π(2) ≤ 1 (illiquid collateral), the largest and smallest fixed points are smaller than the
largest and smallest fixed points when we set π(1) ≡ π(2) ≡ 1 (the case of liquid collateral). As
illiquid collateral yields smaller total payments p(1) + p(2), it yields larger payment shortfalls.
A.7 Analysis of Collateral-First Protocol
In several places in this paper, we compare our baseline model of Sections 2.2–2.3 and Sec-
tions 3.1–3.2 with alternative models. In making these comparisons, we use the notation qij
and π̂ (with superscripts to distinguish rounds) to denote payments and prices in the alternative
model. The specific meaning of these variables will be different in different sections as we use
this notation to compare our baseline model against different alternatives.
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In this section, we use (q
(1)
ij , q
(2)
ij ) and (π̂
(1), π̂(2)) to denote two rounds of payments and
collateral prices under a protocol in which payments precede collateral seizure in Round 1.
First-round payments are characterized by
q
(1)
ij =
{
p̄ij ∧
[
a
(1)
ij A
(1)
i + [(p̄ij − a
(1)
ij A
(1)
i )
+ ∧ π̂mij ]
]
, i ∈ Dq;
p̄ij , i /∈ Dq.
(61)
The first case should be read as follows: node i makes a partial payment to node j of a
(1)
ij A
(1)
i ;
any residual obligation (p̄ij−a(1)ij A
(1)
i )
+ is paid from collateral, up to the amount available π̂mij ;
the total payment cannot exceed the amount due p̄ij . The assets A
(1)
i have the same form as in
(7), but now with incoming payments q
(1)
ki ; the default set is determined exactly as in (8), but
we have labeled it Dq to indicate its dependence on the payments q(1). The proportions a
(1)
ij
are as given in (19) and thus reflect the collateral posted. Upon node i’s default, the shares of
collateral seized and sold by node j become
∆qij =
mij ∧ [p̄ij−a
(1)
ij A
(1)
i ]
+
π̂(1)
, i ∈ Dq;
0, i /∈ Dq.
(62)
The first case in (62) captures the feature that a failed node’s collateral can be seized and
liquidated only after its other assets are exhausted. Set ∆q =
∑
i
∑
j ∆
q
ij . As before, the
price impact function π̂(1) = e−α∆
q
determines the equilibrium asset price. Once first-round
payments and π̂(1) are determined, second-round payments q
(2)
ij and π̂
(2) are characterized by
(23)–(25), just as before. The proof of Proposition 3.1 can be used to show the existence of
first- and second-round clearing payments and prices (q(1), π̂(1)) and (q(2), π̂(2)).
In the case of liquid collateral, π ≡ 1, total payments in the original (collateral first) model
and the alternative (payments first) model are the same:
Proposition A.1. Assume that collateral is posted in cash so that there are no fire-sale effects.
If (p
(1)
ij , p
(2)
ij ), i, j ∈ N , are total clearing payments for the original model, then q
(1)
ij = p
(1)
ij and
q
(2)
ij = p
(2)
ij , i, j ∈ N , are total clearing payments in the alternative model with delayed collateral
seizure. Thus, with liquid collateral, the two protocols yield the same default set and the same
payment shortfalls.
Proof of Proposition A.1. We first show that if all incoming payments to node i agree under
the two models, q
(1)
ki = p
(1)
ki , k ∈ N , then outgoing payments p
(1)
ij given by (10) and q
(1)
ij given
by (61) agree for all j ∈ N .
If all incoming payments to node i agree under the two models, then the two models yield
the same A
(1)
i , and i ∈ D if and only if i ∈ Dq. If i 6∈ D, then q
(1)
ij = p̄ij = p
(1)
ij , for all j.
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Suppose i 6∈ D. If p̄ij ≤ a(1)ij A
(1)
i , then (10) and (61) both evaluate to p̄ij . If p̄ij > a
(1)
ij A
(1)
i , then
(61) evaluates to
q
(1)
ij = p̄ij ∧
[
a
(1)
ij A
(1)
i + [p̄ij − a
(1)
ij A
(1)
i ] ∧mij
]
= p̄ij ∧
[
p̄ij ∧ (mij + a(1)ij A
(1)
i )
]
,
which agrees with (10). Thus, q
(1)
ij = p
(1)
ij , for all j.
We now turn to the second-round payments. We assume that all first-round payments
agree under the two models, and we assume that all second-round incoming payments agree,
q
(2)
ki = p
(2)
ki , for all k ∈ N , and we show that this implies that q
(2)
ij = p
(2)
ij , for all j ∈ N .
If i 6∈ D, then node i has no second-round payment obligations, so q(2)ij = p
(2)
ij = 0, for all j.
Suppose i ∈ D. If the amount of returned collateral ri is the same in the two models, then the
payments made by node i under the two models agree because they are determined by (14).
The only remaining case to consider is the possibility that the two models may produce
different quantities of returned collateral ri. We see from (12) that the quantities of liquidated
collateral ∆ij in (5) and ∆
q
ij in (62) must then differ for some j. We always have ∆
q
ij ≤ ∆ij ≤
mij , so for the quantities to differ we must have ∆
q
ij < ∆ij and thus ∆
q
ij < mij . We must then
have a
(1)
ij A
(1)
i + ∆
q
ij = p̄ij ; if we had a
(1)
ij A
(1)
i + ∆
q
ij < p̄ij , additional collateral would have been
liquidated in the first round of the payments-first protocol to meet the obligation p̄ij . Using
the definition of a
(1)
ij in (6), we can write the equation a
(1)
ij A
(1)
i + ∆
q
ij = p̄ij as
[p̄ij −mij ]+∑
k 6=i[p̄ik −mik]+
A
(1)
i = p̄ij −∆
q
ij ⇒ A
(1)
i >
∑
k 6=i
[p̄ik −mik]+.
But this inequality states node i has sufficient assets to meet all its Round 1 obligations under
the collateral-first protocol, so p
(1)
ij = p̄ij , hence q
(1)
ij = p̄ij , implying that p
(2)
ij = q
(2)
ij = 0.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 4.1
The first round with contract termination is identical to the first round in Section 3.1 so the
existence of (p(1), π(1)) follows from Proposition 3.1. For m ≥ 2, we claim that ∆(m)ij = 0.
In light of (27), it suffices to consider the case i ∈ D(m), j ∈ Sm−1. But if i ∈ D(m) then
i survived the first m − 1 rounds, so i ∈ Sm−1. In this case, (26) yields p̄(m)ij = 0, and (27)
yields ∆
(m)
ij = 0. With all ∆
(m)
ij = 0, the mapping defined by equations (26)–(32) becomes a
special case of the mapping in Lemma A.1, with one modification, which is the inclusion of
the returned collateral value π(m)r
(m)
i in A
(m)
i in (28). The monotonicity proved in Lemma A.1
holds with this modification: the only step affected is (58), where we pick up an additional
positive term from the monotonicity of A
(m)
i in π
(m). The existence of (p(m), π(m)) follows as
in Proposition 3.1.
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 5.2
Proof of Lemma 5.1. The second-round payment obligations in the FT model are given by
p̄
(2)
ij =
{
vij + p̄ij − p(1)ij , i or j ∈ D(1);
0, otherwise.
(63)
This follows from (26) with m = 2, recalling that all nodes are in S0. Under the ST model,
q
(1)
ij = p
(1)
ij and the second-round payment obligations are given by
q̄
(2)
ij =
{
vij + p̄ij − p(1)ij , i ∈ D(1);
0, otherwise,
(64)
because the amount vij becomes due only if i defaults. Comparing (63) and (64), we can write
p̄
(2)
ij ≥ q̄
(2)
ij , ∀i, j ∈ N .
Second-round payments under full termination are given by (30) with m = 2. In the proof
of Proposition 4.1, we showed that ∆
(m)
ij = 0 for m ≥ 2, so (30) yields
p
(2)
ij = p̄
(2)
ij ∧ a
(2)
ij
[
c
(2)
i + π
(2)r
(2)
i +
∑
k 6=i
p
(2)
ki
]
, a
(2)
ij =
p̄
(2)
ij∑
k 6=i p̄
(2)
ik
, (65)
taking a
(2)
ij = 0 if node i has no second-round obligations. Under selective termination,
q
(2)
ij = q̄
(2)
ij ∧ â
(2)
ij
[
c
(2)
i + π̂
(2)r
(2)
i +
∑
k 6=i
q
(2)
ki
]
, â
(2)
ij =
q̄
(2)
ij∑
k 6=i q̄
(2)
ik
. (66)
The cash amounts c
(2)
i and returned collateral r
(2)
i are indeed equal in these two expressions
because the two models agree in Round 1. Equations (65) and (66) represent p(2) and q(2) as
fixed points of a common mapping, parameterized by p̄(2) and a(2) in the first case and by q̄(2)
and â(2) in the second case. Moreover, p
(2)
ij in (65) is an increasing function of p̄
(2)
ij and a
(2)
ij ,
and q
(2)
ij in (66) is an increasing function of q̄
(2)
ij and â
(2)
ij .
We have shown that p̄(2) ≥ q̄(2); we now claim that a(2)ij ≥ â
(2)
ij , for all i, j ∈ N . If i ∈ D(1),
then we see from (63) and (64) that p̄
(2)
ik = q̄
(2)
ik , for all k, so a
(2)
ij = â
(2)
ij ; and if i 6∈ D(1) then
â
(2)
ij = 0. The ordering in (36) now follows from Theorem 3 of Milgrom and Roberts [33] for the
smallest and largest fixed points of the two models, which also ensures the existences of these
extremal fixed points.
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Proof of Proposition 5.2. From from (34) we have Ds ⊆ Df , and as noted there Ds = D(1). To
compare payment shortfalls we use (35) to write
Ls − Lf =
∑
i∈D(1)
(pi − qi)−
∑
i∈Df−D(1)
(vi + p̄i − pi)
=
∑
i∈D(1)
(
∑
`≥2
p
(`)
i − q
(2)
i )−
∑
i∈Df−D(1)
(vi + p̄i − pi) (67)
=
∑
i∈D(1)
(
∑
`≥2
p
(`)
i − q
(2)
i )−
∑
i∈Df−D(1)
(vi −
∑
`≥2
p
(`)
i ). (68)
Equation (67) uses two properties: the first-round payments agree, p
(1)
i = q
(1)
i , for all i; and
under selective termination, there are no payments after the second round, so q
(`)
i = 0, for
` > 2. Equation (68) follows because if i 6∈ D(1), then node i must have met its first-round
payment obligations, so p̄i = p
(1)
i .
Under full termination, if node i survives Round 1 but defaults in a subsequent round (i.e.,
i ∈ Df −D(1)) then its payments
∑
`≥2 p
(`)
i must be at least as large as its net worth ei defined
in (39); if a node paid out less than its net worth, it would not default. From (68) we get
Ls − Lf ≥
∑
i∈D(1)
(
∑
`≥2
p
(`)
i − q
(2)
i )−
∑
i∈Df−D(1)
(vi − ei). (69)
In case (i), Lemma 5.1 applies, so p
(2)
i ≥ q
(2)
i and the first term on the right in (69) is
positive. Under condition (40), we conclude from (69) that Ls ≥ Lf . For case (ii) we note that
if mij ≤ p̄ij , for all i, j ∈ N , then, under selective termination, nodes that default in Round 1 do
not have any collateral returned and do not receive any subsequent payments, so they cannot
make any subsequent payments; thus, q
(2)
i = 0 in (69), so (40) again implies L
s ≥ Lf .
Proof of Proposition 5.3. Under full termination and the condition vi ≤ ei, ∀i /∈ D(1), a node
that survives the first round can meet its second-round obligations because these obligations vi
do not exceed the node’s net worth ei. Thus, D
f = D(1), and without further defaults, p
(`)
ij = 0,
for all ` > 2.
In the no-termination scenario, D(1) is also the default set, because the two models agree in
Round 1. In the absence of excess collateral, a node that defaults in Round 1 has no collateral
returned. If no contracts are terminated then such a node has no influx of cash and therefore
cannot make any further payments: q
(`)
ij = 0 for ` ≥ 2 if i ∈ D(1). If i 6∈ D(1), then node i has
no payment obligations after Round 1 so again q
(`)
ij = 0 for ` ≥ 2. The difference in payment
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shortfalls is given by
Ln − Lf =
∑
i∈D(1)
(p̄i − qi)−
∑
i∈D(1)
(vi + p̄i − pi)
=
∑
i∈D(1)
(pi − qi)−
∑
i∈D(1)
vi
=
∑
i∈D(1)
p
(2)
i −
∑
i∈D(1)
vi, (70)
where the first equation uses Df = D(1), and the third step uses p
(1)
i = q
(1)
i , q
(`)
i = 0, ` ≥ 2,
and p
(`)
i = 0, for all ` > 2.
If i ∈ D(1), then node i’s total second-round payments are given by the lesser of its payment
obligations and its cash influx, so
p
(2)
i = (vi + p̄i − p
(1)
i ) ∧ (
∑
k/∈D(1)
vki +
∑
k∈D(1)
p
(2)
ki )
≥ vi ∧ (vi +
∑
k∈D(1)
p
(2)
ki ) = vi,
using the second case in (41). It now follows from (70) that Ln − Lf ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 5.4. Under both selective termination and no termination, if the network
has no excess collateral then no collateral is returned in Round 2 and no payments are made
in Round 2. Selective termination does not create any new defaults, so Ds = D(1) = Dn.
Compared with no termination, selective termination increases second-round payment obliga-
tions; but with no second-round payments made, this results in larger payments shortfalls, so
Ln ≤ Ls.
B Appendix: Institutional Features
This appendix provides some institutional background on collateral ownership and contract
termination in the markets for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives; similar considerations apply
to many forms of collateralized borrowing, including standard repurchase agreements. The
points we emphasize are as follows: collateral is owned by the posting party until that party
defaults; upon default by the posting party, the surviving party may seize the collateral quickly;
a surviving party may face delays in recovering collateral posted to a counterparty that defaults;
parties may not ordinarily terminate contracts at will as a means of recovering posted collateral.
OTC derivatives are traded either bilaterally (the non-cleared market) or through central
counterparties (CCPs). Following reforms introduced in 2009, when two parties enter into a
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bilateral contract, they post collateral to each other, and the amount of collateral is updated
regularly as market prices changes. The amounts exchanged may be asymmetric; for example,
the seller of an option will need to post more collateral than the buyer.
These arrangements are typically governed by an ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives
Association) agreement. Under such an agreement, each party retains ownership of the collateral
it pledges and grants to the other party a “priority interest” in the collateral in case the pledging
party defaults. Contracts agreed to under an ISDA agreement are terminated by events of
default and certain additional events including changes in law, certain tax events, force majeure
events, and other triggers (such as credit downgrades) that the parties might agree to. (See,
e.g., ISDA [29].) Neither party may unilaterally terminate the contract unless that option is
itself part of the contract.
The internationally agreed principles governing bilateral margin (BCBS-IOSCO [4], p.23)
specify that it should be “immediately available to the collecting party in the event of the
counterpartys default.” They also state (p.24) that “collateral collected as initial margin from
the customer is treated as a customer asset” and (p.8) “the collected margin must be subject to
arrangements that fully protect the posting party to the extent possible under applicable law in
the event that the collecting party enters bankruptcy.” Our model is designed to capture these
principles in simplified form: collateral belongs to the posting party; it can be seized quickly by
the collecting party if the posting party defaults; the return of collateral to the posting party
may be delayed by bankruptcy proceedings if the collecting party fails.
In the centrally cleared market, CCPs collect but do not post collateral. Here, too, collateral
arrangements ensure immediate access by the CCP in case of a counterpartys default. Trades
with a CCP cannot be unilaterally terminated because the CCP needs to maintain a “matched
book,” with an offsetting contract for every trade.
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